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Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1679 (2006), in which the Council called upon the African Union (AU) and the United Nations to agree upon requirements necessary to strengthen the capacity of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to enforce the security arrangements of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and requested me, after the return of the joint African Union and United Nations assessment mission, to submit to the Council recommendations on all relevant aspects of the mandate of the United Nations operation in Darfur.

2. In addition to the recommendations in Security Council resolution 1679 (2006), the present report will describe the main elements of the Darfur Peace Agreement and identify the implementation priorities in that regard; identify some of the major risks and challenges involved in deploying a peacekeeping operation in Darfur; elaborate on support the United Nations could offer to AMIS to enhance the ability of the AU mission to protect civilians and implement the Agreement; propose a mandate and mission structure for a United Nations operation in Darfur; and provide details on the various components of the proposed mission and their specific functions.

II. Background

A. History of the conflict

3. In my monthly reports to the Council on Darfur, I have described in detail the violence and destruction that have plagued the region for more than three years. When the current conflict erupted in February 2003, Darfur had already long experienced localized violence exacerbated by ethnic, economic and political dimensions and competition over increasingly scarce resources. But the attacks early in 2003 by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and the Government's decision to respond by deploying its national armed forces and mobilizing local militia, introduced a completely new kind of terrifying violence. The notorious Janjaweed, coupled with militia attacks and indiscriminate air bombardment, contributed to the razing and burning of villages, the rape of girls and women, the abduction of children, and the

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destruction of food and water sources. The result has been death, devastation and displacement in Darfur, with more than 200,000 civilian casualties, more than 2 million people displaced from their homes and condemned to misery, and millions more having their livelihoods destroyed.

4. The cycle of terror inside Darfur also threatens regional peace and security. The 1,000-kilometre border between the Sudan and Chad has been repeatedly violated by armed groups and has ratcheted up tension between Khartoum and N'Djamena. The cross-border violence has also led to additional flows of refugees and internally displaced persons in both Chad and the Sudan, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the region.

B. Efforts to address the conflict

African Union action

5. For several years, the African Union has led international political efforts to seek a solution to the crisis. The organization launched the negotiations of the inter-Sudanese peace talks, also known as the Abuja talks, which began in Addis Ababa in July 2004, and were subsequently relocated to Abuja. The talks proceeded with the support and close cooperation of international partners, including the United Nations.

6. The efforts culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006. While all parties to the conflict were present at those talks, only the Government delegation and the SLM/A faction led by Minni Minawi signed the Agreement. At its 51st meeting, on 15 May 2006, the AU Peace and Security Council, while endorsing the Agreement, regretted the failure of the SLM/A group led by Abdelwahid al-Nur and JEM, led by Khalil Ibrahim, to sign the Agreement, and urged them to do so by 31 May 2006, failing which the Peace and Security Council would consider measures, including sanctions, to be applied against the leadership and members of the two groups.

7. Despite this extension and diplomatic efforts to encourage non-signatories to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement, JEM and Abdelwahid faction of SLM/A remain outside the Agreement. On 7 June, the leaders of those groups issued a statement, jointly with two other movement leaders, reiterating their rejection of the Agreement and calling on the signatories and other actors to revisit their position. On 8 June, however, some members of the Abdelwahid faction and JEM splinter groups signed a declaration of commitment, in which they expressed support for the Darfur Peace Agreement, and agreed to be bound by its provisions and participate fully in its implementation.

8. The political initiatives of the African Union were complemented by the courageous deployment of AU troops in Darfur. While the current deployment of AMIS stands at 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police, the African Union first deployed 60 military observers and 310 protection troops in order to monitor and observe the compliance of the parties to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004. Owing to increasing insecurity in Darfur, the African Union decided on 20 October 2004 to enhance the mission, bringing it to a total of 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel and 815 civilian police, as well as complementary civilian personnel. The mandate of this much larger mission was

to monitor and observe compliance with the Agreement and to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. In the light of a precarious security situation and persistent attacks against civilians, the AMIS force was further increased by the AU Peace and Security Council on 28 April 2005 to its current total authorized strength of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police.

9. Following multiple additional extensions, the Mission's mandate was further extended to 30 September 2006 at the 46th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council. At the AU Summit in Banjul, on 2 July 2006, the Chairperson of the African Union, Denis Sassou Nguesso, said that AMIS will continue to fulfil its mission until the end of the year, based on my request. The Chairperson's commitment to extend the AMIS mandate to the end of 2006 has yet to be formalized by the Peace and Security Council.

10. At its 45th and 46th meetings, on 12 January and 10 March 2006, the Peace and Security Council expressed support for and then decided to support, in principle, a transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation in Darfur.

11. Following the signing on 5 May 2006 of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the Peace and Security Council decided on 15 May that, in view of the signing of the Agreement, concrete steps should be taken to effect the transition from AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Most recently, the Peace and Security Council, in a communiqué of 27 June, reaffirmed its decisions of 10 March and 15 May 2006 on ending the mandate of AMIS by 30 September 2006, and on the transition from AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The communiqué indicated the Council's willingness to further extend the mandate if agreement was reached between the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations on a transition to a United Nations operation.

United Nations action

12. At the same time, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations launched a massive humanitarian operation in Darfur, constantly expanding its activities to respond to the needs of an increasing number of people displaced by appalling violence. Despite persistent restrictions on access to vulnerable populations and serious funding shortages, the humanitarian operation in Darfur has been able to sustain, in an unprecedented manner, more than 2.5 million war-affected persons, containing direct major threats to their survival by providing them with food, health care, shelter and other essentials. This often heroic work is being carried out by more than 13,000 humanitarian workers from over 80 non-governmental organizations, Red Cross/Red Crescent societies and 13 United Nations agencies, and is broadly coordinated by the United Nations.

13. Further to the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1564 (2004), the United Nations established a significant human rights presence in Darfur that monitors and verifies cases of human rights abuses, liaises with local authorities, including police and prosecutors, monitors trials, and assists in efforts towards the protection of civilians in Darfur.

14. In addition, the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations signed a joint communiqué (see S/2004/635) on 3 July 2004, in which both parties committed themselves to concrete actions to improve the security and humanitarian

situation in Darfur. The joint communiqué established a high-level Joint Implementation Mechanism to follow and appraise developments and report on progress to the parties. Since September 2004, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has run a major rule of law programme, carrying out human rights training and providing formal and informal legal representation for victims of torture, gender-based violence, and other human rights violations in an effort to combat impunity and contribute to long-term peace and stability in the region.

15. In addition to its own activities, the United Nations also provides strategic support to AMIS through the United Nations Assistance Cell in Addis Ababa, as well as some action on the ground. This work has contributed directly to the development and enhancement of African Union plans for AMIS. The Cell has facilitated the provision of practical assistance by the United Nations to AMIS operations in the field, including the deployment of technical experts to assist AMIS in the areas of planning, logistics, communications and transport.

16. The United Nations, through the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and other facilities, also provided considerable support to efforts to reach a political settlement of the conflict by providing good offices, substantive expertise and logistical support to the African Union mediation and the participants attending the talks in Abuja. I made this political settlement a personal priority, as well as a priority of the United Nations.

17. In accordance with relevant communiqués of the AU Peace and Security Council and Security Council resolutions, the United Nations and the African Union made all preparations to undertake a joint assessment mission to the Sudan to determine the requirements for strengthening AMIS and to develop a plan for a transition to a multidimensional United Nations operation in Darfur.

18. I asked Lakhdar Brahimi, accompanied by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hédi Annabi, to travel to Khartoum from 22 to 25 May 2006 as my Special Envoy to discuss transition and the deployment of the assessment mission. While Government officials did not agree to transition, they did allow the African Union and the United Nations to undertake a joint technical assessment in Khartoum and Darfur.

19. Under the joint leadership of Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, and the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Saïd Djinnit, the technical assessment mission undertook its programme of work in the Sudan from 9 to 23 June. In addition to the four multidisciplinary teams that gathered information throughout all of Darfur, the Under-Secretary-General and the Commissioner held extensive consultations with President Omar al-Bashir and Government officials in Khartoum, and met with a wide range of stakeholders in Darfur, and also travelled to Chad to meet with the President, Idriss Déby.

20. The assessment mission found that the population of the Sudan held deeply polarized views about the performance of AMIS and the necessity of a United Nations peace operation. Government officials supported the strengthening of AMIS by the United Nations and the international community, but questioned the need for a transition from the African Union to a United Nations operation, on the basis of their assessment that the situation was improving. On the other hand, representatives of camps of internally displaced persons, civil society groups, and some political

parties voiced serious misgivings about the effectiveness of the protection provided by AMIS and demanded the earliest transition to a United Nations operation. This position was echoed by the President of Chad. At the same time, however, all agreed on the need for continuing United Nations humanitarian and recovery activities in Darfur. On 22 June, these and other findings were presented to President al-Bashir, who reiterated, in strong terms, that he and his Government did not accept the possibility of a transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation.

21. The findings and initial recommendations of the joint assessment, which form the basis of the present report, were developed with the understanding that the Darfur Peace Agreement provides a framework for any proposals to strengthen AMIS and plan a transition to a United Nations operation.

III. The Darfur Peace Agreement

A. Main elements of the Agreement

22. The Darfur Peace Agreement consists of four substantive chapters, on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, comprehensive ceasefire and security arrangements, and the Darfur-Darfur dialogue and consultation. The document envisions that AMIS, together with the parties, will implement the Agreement, with some assistance from the United Nations and the broader international community.

Power-sharing

23. In the area of power-sharing, the parties agreed on a federal system of government, with the establishment of a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority having jurisdiction over the three Darfur States. They also agreed to hold a referendum no later than July 2010 to determine the future status of Darfur, namely whether to establish a region of Darfur or retain the three States. The northern boundaries of Darfur will return to their position as at 1 January 1956, with a technical ad hoc team to carry out the demarcation process. The Agreement also outlines posts in various levels of government to be allocated to nominees of the movements. For example, the parties agreed on the creation of the post of Senior Assistant to the President, the fourth-ranking member in the Presidency and also Chairperson of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, to be nominated from the movements. The Agreement allocates to the movements 12 of the 360 seats in the National Assembly, 21 of 73 seats in the State legislatures of the three Darfur States, as well as the post of Governor in one of the Darfur States and two posts of Deputy Governor (in the other two Darfur States). The Agreement also calls for measures to address the representation of Darfurians in the national civil service, armed forces and the police.

Wealth-sharing

24. With regard to wealth-sharing, it was agreed that the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission established by the Agreement would decide on a formula for transferring funding from Khartoum to the Darfur States. The parties also agreed to establish a Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, to which the Government would allocate US$ 300 million in 2006, and not less than $200 million for both 2007 and 2008, and the Government pledged to provide an

initial $30 million to a compensation fund to address claims of people affected by the conflict.

25. The Agreement makes provision for the initiation of a Joint Assessment Mission to identify the needs of post-conflict economic recovery, development and poverty eradication in preparation for a donors' conference, to be convened within three months of the signing of the Agreement. The parties also agreed to establish three State Land Commissions to address issues related to land-use management and natural resource development, and a Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission to address the needs of displaced and war-affected persons, including return to their homes and the provision of basic services.

Ceasefire and security arrangements

26. Concerning the security arrangements, the parties agreed to strengthen the existing ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanisms. The Agreement detailed measures to increase security for internally displaced persons and humanitarian supply routes, including through establishing demilitarized zones around camps of displaced persons, and buffer zones to separate forces on the ground.

27. The parties agreed that the Government would submit and implement a plan for the neutralization and disarmament of the Janjaweed and armed militia, while the movements would receive non-military support in assembly areas. With regard to demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, some of the movements' military personnel would be integrated into Sudanese security organs, while others would be provided with social and economic support to assist their return to civilian life. The Agreement established the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission to coordinate implementation of all security provisions.

Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation

28. Finally, the parties agreed to convene a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, to be held under African Union leadership, in cooperation with international partners. It will aim to promote reconciliation and broader ownership of the Darfur peace process. It was agreed that a preparatory committee would include members representing the Government, movements, civil society organizations, tribal leaders, the United Nations, the European Union and the League of Arab States, and be chaired by the African Union. The Committee is tasked with preparing the agenda of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, identifying some 800 to 1,000 participants, and determining the venue and funding modalities. The Dialogue and Consultation offers the best chance to address issues in a transparent and equitable forum and will be the critical tool for broadening and popularizing the peace process.

B. Implications for immediate action

29. During the transition period, AMIS requires immediate strengthening to enable it to monitor and promote the Agreement and hold the parties accountable to their undertakings. The Agreement's security provisions have created a myriad of new formidable tasks for the AU Mission, including the establishment and patrolling of demilitarized zones around camps for internally displaced persons; the establishment and patrolling of buffer zones; the patrolling of humanitarian supply

routes and nomadic migration routes; a rapid cycle of investigating and reporting cases of ceasefire violations; deployment in camps of displaced persons and areas of civilian control; monitoring of security in those camps; the protection of women and children; and the provision of training and capacity-building to the community police.

30. The African Union is also called on to play a central role in establishing the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation through its chairmanship of the Preparatory Committee and its obligation to identify the participants in the Dialogue and Consultation, and its venue and funding. In order to meet its obligations set out in the Darfur Peace Agreement, the African Union has established a Darfur Peace Agreement implementation team, but this remains under-resourced.

31. At the same time, the Agreement calls for the United Nations to participate in the Preparatory Committee for the Dialogue and Consultation and, together with the African Union, set up the secretariat and provide logistical support to the Dialogue.

32. The Darfur Peace Agreement also requires the United Nations to lead, together with the African Union and the World Bank, the Joint Assessment Mission to identify the needs for post-conflict economic recovery and development in the three Darfur States. The Agreement requests the participation of the United Nations in the Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission to address, specifically, the special needs of displaced persons.

33. The Agreement further calls on the United Nations to participate in the Ceasefire Commission, the Joint Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit, and the Logistics Coordination Committee, which would supervise and coordinate the provision of non-military logistical support to the movements.

34. In order to meet these obligations, as well as to support the African Union during this critical period, the United Nations system in the Sudan has formed a corresponding team that is working closely with the African Union. However, the United Nations team also lacks resources to fulfil the roles assigned to it by the Agreement and to provide sustained assistance to AMIS.

IV. Risks and challenges, including regional considerations

35. The formation of new alliances among various factions and the Government related to the Darfur Peace Agreement is severely complicating an already complex security situation on the ground. The National Redemption Front, a new alliance of Darfurian rebels opposing the Agreement, claimed to lead an attack on Government positions in Northern Kordofan on 3 July 2006, widening the conflict beyond Darfur's eastern border. There are also indications that the Minni Minawi faction of SLM/A, supported by the Sudanese Armed Forces, is carrying out major military operations against non-signatories of the Agreement and the villages in areas under their control, resulting in further massive displacements and suffering.

36. There is a growing perception among non-signatories of the Agreement that AMIS, for various reasons, is not in a position to implement the Agreement. Some members of the G19, a rebel group that does not support the Agreement, believe that AMIS may not be resisting the military operations of the Sudanese Armed Forces and SLM/A Minni Minawi and even threatened to attack the AU Mission. The Peace Agreement in this sense may become a fault line in Darfur. Every effort should be

made to reverse this trend by strongly encouraging non-signatories to sign, by holding to account all those, without exception, who carry out violence, and by engaging in a dialogue with all key stakeholders in anticipation of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.

37. The implementation of the Agreement faces a number of other serious challenges. An enormous effort by the parties and their international partners will be required to establish the complex and ambitious network of mechanisms called for in the Agreement, including in the security area. AMIS, in particular, will have to be rapidly strengthened so that it is enabled to play the role that the Agreement envisaged for it. Meeting the deadlines set in the Agreement, several of which have already passed, will also require full commitment and efficient action by the parties. They will require considerable support from the international community. The window of opportunity the Agreement represents may be small and could close if there is no extra effort to implement it effectively.

38. While attempting to address these political and security challenges, millions of war-affected civilians in Darfur will continue to require life-sustaining humanitarian assistance, at least until the end of 2007. It is not likely that sustainable returns and resumption of livelihoods will occur until security conditions in Darfur improve.

39. Full consideration must also be given to tensions in the border area with Chad, and generally in the region. Resolution of the conflict in Darfur is seriously threatened by the almost open presence of Chadian rebels in Darfur, the cross-border movement of fighters and weapons, and the slow pace of the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement to Settle the Dispute between the Republic of Chad and the Republic of the Sudan, of 8 February 2006 (see S/2006/103).

V. United Nations support to AMIS

40. In this environment, ensuring that civilians are protected, their human rights respected and the Darfur Peace Agreement successfully implemented will clearly be an immense challenge, requiring a coordinated, massive, and multifaceted effort, with the involvement of the international community at large. The most immediate and urgent area for action to achieve these goals should involve strengthening AMIS, to ensure that it has all the capabilities and resources required to protect civilians and internally displaced persons, create an environment where people can start returning to their homes and maximize the possibility of early success in implementing the Agreement.

41. Notwithstanding continuous efforts by the African Union and partners to improve the mission, AMIS continues to face a number of formidable difficulties in conducting the peacekeeping operation. In addition to the obstruction of its activities by the parties, including the imposition of a crippling curfew and other restrictions by the Government and active hostility on the part of some rebel groups, AMIS has been grappling with major challenges, including insufficient mobility, communications, and public information capabilities, as well as command and control difficulties and the absence of fixed and predictable financing.

42. To help AMIS better address some of these challenges, the United Nations could provide direct and significant support to the AU Mission in a number of priority areas, which were identified and agreed during the joint United Nations-

African Union assessment mission. They include command and control; communications; enhanced mobility; engineering; training; location and sourcing of water; resource and administrative management; and public information. Some elements of this support package can be delivered in the short term. Others, which are more ambitious, would require significant additional resources to implement and the authorization of the Security Council and the General Assembly. In addition, all aspects of the proposal would have to be finalized and implemented in close collaboration with the African Union and in full coordination with AMIS partners.

43. Short-term assistance, in coordination with input from bilateral partners, could focus on the ongoing establishment and development of integrated command and control elements, which would allow AMIS to further increase the effectiveness and coordination of its operations, information management and planning, as well as the integration of the Mission and its logistical support. This could be achieved through the provision, on the basis of UNMIS, of civilian and military staff support to AMIS to carry forward the establishment of a well-integrated Joint Operations Centre, a Joint Mission Analysis Centre, a Joint Logistics Centre and an Air Operations Centre.

44. Assistance could also be provided through the provision of support and staff officers to the Ceasefire Commission secretariat. Advisers in the areas of budgetary and administrative management could also be made available to AMIS to provide hands-on assistance in these areas.

45. Also through UNMIS, communications and information technology specialists could be deployed to mobilize existing communications assets to provide a more effective communications network.

46. Extremely important support could also be provided to AMIS in the short term in the area of public information, particularly with regard to dissemination and promotion of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.

47. While most of the actions described above could be taken relatively quickly and without major resource implications, the United Nations could also undertake a series of resource-intensive, high-impact activities, described below, which could have a major and more lasting positive effect on the AU operation in Darfur.

48. In the area of communications, the United Nations could include an expansion of the existing African Union Mission in the Sudan network, increasing the Mission's mobile communications capability by installing VHF and HF mobile radios, providing an additional 200 portable radios to enhance day-to-day communications within regional headquarters, installation of a large telephone exchange at AMIS headquarters in Al-Fasher, the installation of a wireless local area network at each regional headquarters, and facilitation of local network mail, including web-mail access for selected staff at headquarters, regional headquarters and outstations fitted with Internet access.

49. Another critical step would be to carry out a water survey of Darfur, including a hydrological survey and initial contracting for the drilling of boreholes. This would be a major step in addressing the single most critical support issue.

50. Engineering and specialized logistical support could also be provided to AMIS. Working to United Nations standards and regulations, these could support the expansion and enhancement of the Mission's infrastructure and operations,

provide support for the establishment of the three sector headquarters and the establishment of the envisaged 18 new company sites, as well as airfield and heliport development.

51. A comprehensive ground mobility package could also be created, which would significantly enhance the rapid response capability of AMIS. The package would include significant numbers of additional armoured personnel carriers, heavy multi-purpose vehicles, ambulances and recovery vehicles, together with related management structures and support capacities.

52. Significant support could also be provided to enhance deterrence, early warning and force projection of AMIS through the introduction of additional air assets, which could be managed by the above-mentioned Air Operations Centre, with a focus on increasing tactical flying hours. An effective use of the crucial force multipliers dedicated to tactical projection of troops would provide the platform for a credible and effective rapid reaction capability. In addition, small fixed-wing aircraft could provide a surveillance capacity for the force.

53. In collaboration with AMIS troop-contributing countries and AMIS partners, enhanced predeployment training packages could be provided in accordance with United Nations standards allowing new troops to prepare for an expanded AMIS mandate while also facilitating a possible transition to a United Nations operation in the future, subject to further consultations, which are required. Complementary induction and onsite training packages could also be provided including training related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and training of personnel assigned to the new forward joint mission headquarters.

54. Specifically with regard to the generation of AMIS civilian police, the United Nations could also provide direct and meaningful assistance in the short term through deployment of joint United Nations-African Union selection assistance teams to police-contributing countries, as well as mentoring and training on the ground.

55. Broader public information assistance could also be provided to AMIS in its efforts to consolidate and enhance support for the Agreement, as well as in helping to create support and understanding for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. This could take the form of activities which would promote the Darfur Peace Agreement, including an initial round of regional workshops in Darfur for United Nations and AMIS staff who interact with civil society in Darfur, in order to equip the staff with the knowledge and materials that will enable them to effectively promote the benefits of the Agreement to the civil society representatives they meet. Other activities could include the provision of some civil affairs capacity to interact with the population, public information specialists, additional human rights advisers, gender and HIV/AIDS specialists, and others.

56. A mechanism should be established to coordinate activities to promote the Agreement with activities undertaken by international partners, to avoid duplication and to enhance targeted messaging.

57. In addition to actions in support of AMIS, it will also be extremely important for the United Nations to play an active and effective role in support of the implementation of the Agreement. This would require introducing new capacities to UNMIS, which would be dedicated, initially, to assisting the African Union in coordinating and monitoring implementation of the Agreement; preparing,

convening and staffing the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation; and training and providing capacity support to the parties, to enable them to establish and staff the numerous institutions that form the core of the Agreement. In the meantime, the African Union and the United Nations should initiate, without delay, discussions on the various aspects of the implementation of the proposed support, including with regard to the new concept of operations for AMIS.

58. The measures being proposed in this support package would directly address many of the main challenges facing AMIS. Implementing the proposal would require unprecedented action on the part of the United Nations, unequivocal authorization by the Security Council, and follow-up action by the General Assembly, and full support from Member States.

59. To take forward both the immediate and more resource-intensive proposals to support AMIS, a multidisciplinary UNMIS office should be established in Al-Fasher and supported by expanded and strengthened UNMIS field offices in Darfur. In addition to focusing support to AMIS, the regional office would be responsible for implementing the existing responsibilities of UNMIS for any future planning of United Nations activities in the region. A significant portion of the additional staff deployed to these offices would be fully dedicated to supporting the AMIS operation until transition was effected. The civilian and military support personnel will be fully administered by and accountable to the United Nations.

60. While the international community pursues all available avenues to improve the security situation on the ground through the strengthening of AMIS and implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, it is also essential that the ongoing, massive humanitarian operation continue at required levels, to sustain millions in Darfur for the short and medium term. This will require considerable continuing support from the international community to ensure that adequate funding is available for humanitarian operations. With escalating insecurity and increased direct targeting of humanitarian personnel, international support will also be required to achieve the full cooperation of the parties to ensure that the humanitarian community has full and unimpeded access to all those requiring assistance.

VI. Proposed United Nations peace support operation in Darfur

A. Mandate

61. As envisaged in relevant resolutions of the Security Council and decisions of the African Union Peace and Security Council, I would like to recommend, subject to the consent of the Government of the Sudan and in concurrence with other parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement, an expansion of the unified United Nations Mission in the Sudan into the Darfur region as from 1 January 2007. The mission would have as its abiding priority the protection of civilians and would work closely with the Government of National Unity and other key actors to this end.

62. The mission would promote and support the efforts of the parties to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement, within the overarching aim of assisting the Sudanese in bringing peace and development to the entire country. The mission's main tasks, many of which are complementary to the existing UNMIS tasks of assisting the

implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and already defined in Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), would include the following main pillars:

Support for the peace process and good offices

- To support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and, in particular, to cooperate with and support the efforts of the African Union in this regard.
- To participate in and support the major bodies established by the Darfur Peace Agreement, in coordination with other international actors, in the implementation of their mandate, including through provision of technical assistance and logistical support to those bodies.
- To facilitate the preparation and conduct of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, provide good offices, and assist the efforts of the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement to ensure that the peace process is inclusive.
- To develop and implement, in close collaboration with the African Union, the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement and other major stakeholders, reconciliation strategies and initiatives for the Darfur region.
- To assist in promoting the accurate understanding of the peace process and the role of UNMIS by means of an effective public information campaign, in coordination with the African Union.
- To assist the parties, in cooperation with other international actors, in the preparations for and conduct of the referendums provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement.

The rule of law, governance and human rights

- To assist all stakeholders and local Government authorities, in particular in their efforts to transfer resources in an equitable manner from the national Government to the States, and implement reconstruction plans and agreements on land use and compensation issues.
- To work with the national police, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, in reform restructuring and institutional development, training and capacity-building of the police, movements' police liaison officers, and community police, and to monitor their performance through mentoring, co-location, and joint patrols.
- To assist all stakeholders, in cooperation with other United Nations actors, in harnessing the full capacity of women to participate in the peace process, including through political representation, economic empowerment and protection from gender-based violence.
- To assist all stakeholders in promoting the rule of law, including through support to strengthening an independent judiciary and professional corrections system, and combating impunity and protecting the human rights of all people of the Sudan, in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and non-governmental organizations.
- To ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise in Darfur to contribute towards efforts to protect and promote human rights in the Sudan,

including by carrying out human rights monitoring in Darfur; to strengthen national capacities to ensure accountability for crimes committed in Darfur, and to coordinate international efforts towards the protection of human rights with particular attention to vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children, acting in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, and non-governmental organizations.

Humanitarian assistance, recovery and reintegration

- To support the coordination of international humanitarian assistance.
- To coordinate international efforts with regard to the protection of civilians, with particular attention to vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children.
- To assist all stakeholders in mobilizing resources and implementing plans for the socio-economic reintegration of former combatants.
- To assist in implementing plans and mobilizing resources for the socio-economic reintegration of displaced persons in their former communities and livelihoods.
- To support the establishment of financial mechanisms for the mobilization and management of international assistance for the recovery and development requirements identified by the Joint Assessment Mission.

Security and physical protection

- To assume all those responsibilities assigned by the security arrangements chapter of the Darfur Peace Agreement to AMIS which remain outstanding from the moment of transfer of authority from the African Union to the United Nations.
- To assist in monitoring and verifying the implementation of the redeployment and disengagement provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement, including by actively providing security and patrolling the demilitarized and buffer zones and through the deployment of police, including formed police units, in areas where internally displaced persons are concentrated, along key routes of migration, and other vital points.
- To take all action necessary to protect civilians under imminent threat, within the capability of the United Nations presence, and to deter, including pre-emptively, potential spoilers through robust action.
- To assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme called for in the Darfur Peace Agreement, and to actively participate in disarmament, in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and non-governmental organizations.
- To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and facilitate the operations of its partners in this respect.

B. Mission structure

63. Currently, a number of UNMIS components are already conducting activities in Darfur pursuant to resolution 1590 (2005). These include human rights, protection, rule of law, civil affairs, humanitarian liaison and mission support, and are in addition to the good offices function performed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. There are also a number of military and police liaison officers working with AMIS. This United Nations presence would be considerably expanded in the much larger multidimensional operation being proposed.

64. A significant expansion of UNMIS into Darfur calls for a commensurate strengthening of the mission's management capacity. While the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would continue to serve as the overall head of the mission, given the breadth of responsibilities currently facing UNMIS, it will be critical to decentralize, to the Darfur region, the management of the mission's Darfur activities and operations. The importance of maintaining high-level political contact in the region and the likelihood of ongoing insecurity in Darfur, which calls for executive, high-level action in time-sensitive situations, necessitates a dedicated senior management presence in Darfur.

65. Accordingly, management of UNMIS in Darfur would be the responsibility of a Senior Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Darfur. That official, supported by a group of senior staff, would be based in Al-Fasher, and would report through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on all major political issues. The unity of command and control would suggest that the components of the proposed United Nations operation would report through the Senior Deputy Special Representative, while keeping their respective units in Khartoum informed of major developments. Details of the relationship between senior management in Darfur and the rest of UNMIS would be developed to maximize the cost-effectiveness and the overall positive impact of the United Nations presence in Darfur. The Senior Deputy Special Representative would be supported by a Regional Commander for Darfur and a Deputy Police Commissioner for Darfur, who would also be based at the Darfur mission headquarters in Al-Fasher. The Regional Commander for Darfur and the Deputy Police Commissioner for Darfur, while under the operational command of the Senior Deputy Special Representative, would fall under the general operational control of the UNMIS Force Commander and Police Commissioner, respectively.

66. Administrative management of UNMIS activities in Darfur would be decentralized to the extent possible, within the parameters of United Nations rules and regulations. This will be an important step in overcoming the considerable obstacles to deployment and facilitating the provision of expeditious administrative support in the region.

67. The Mission would have a strong coordination function, with the Mission's different components co-locating to the greatest extent possible. To this end, a well-defined liaison and coordination mechanism between the military and police components of an expanded UNMIS and the pre-existing humanitarian community would be established. In order to facilitate the rapid exchange of information, timely response to crises, and to promote an understanding of each others' mandates and structures, the United Nations will deploy military civil-military liaison officers, civilian police liaison officers and civilian civil-military coordination officers to

each sector. While civil-military liaison officers and civilian police liaison officers will remain in their respective chains of command, and the civil-military coordination officers will be part of the Humanitarian-Recovery Liaison Unit in the pillar of the Deputy Special Representative/Regional Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, a civilian-military-police liaison component will be established in the regional headquarters and each sector office, where those officers will co-locate and take an integrated approach to the liaison function.

C. Components

1. Support to the peace process and civil affairs

68. As an immediate priority and in coordination with the African Union, UNMIS would utilize the accumulated knowledge of the different social groups in Darfur to generate support and broad-based involvement in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process. This would include providing targeted capacity-building and support to key social groups who would participate in the dialogue. Those activities would build upon previous civil affairs initiatives, including workshops and meetings being held in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.

69. As UNMIS implements confidence-building measures and programmes that mobilize traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, it will increase liaisons with stakeholders, focusing on nascent social groups and minorities, and including women, youth groups, and representatives of internally displaced persons. In addition, UNMIS technical assistance would be provided to the support structures of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, including the Preparatory Committee, secretariat and Panel of Experts.

70. In the medium term, UNMIS would monitor and provide good offices support to the implementation of the Agreement, particularly in terms of power and wealth-sharing at the Darfur level. Issues of compensation and restitution will take prominence and will be directly influenced by the outcomes of the Dialogue and Consultation. In the long term, the UNMIS strategy should be to ensure that reconciliation initiatives are streamlined with recovery and development dividends.

2. Security: military aspects

71. The primary purpose of a United Nations military operation in Darfur should be to establish a stable and secure environment to protect civilians and support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Initially, the focus of the security operations would be the provision of security to the vulnerable population.

72. Military forces would need to provide area and route security. The harsh terrain and lack of road infrastructure, particularly during the wet season, would require a force equipped with high-mobility ground vehicles and a strong air component. The force would also need to protect United Nations personnel, installations and property, including logistics locations and supplies in transit.

73. While protecting civilians, the force would simultaneously be required to implement specific security provisions of the Peace Agreement. AMIS would have completed some tasks but many would undoubtedly remain. The United Nations would continue to verify and ensure the effective separation of forces by patrolling

redeployment and buffer zones; verify the storage of long-range weapons; monitor, investigate, report and resolve violations of the Agreement through the Ceasefire Commission and the Joint Commission; monitor the border between Darfur and Chad; and support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The scale and complexity of these tasks requires a large force, as well as robust command, control and communications systems for effective operations.

74. A United Nations military force must be capable and ready to deal proactively with spoilers, including in a pre-emptive manner. The mandate should allow the force full freedom of movement and authorize robust action when required. The force should therefore possess surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; an assessment capability to steer operations; and air and ground reaction forces with sufficient military power to deter or defeat spoilers. Reserves would also be needed to deal with unfavourable developments in the security situation.

75. A United Nations mission will also face unprecedented logistic challenges in deploying and supporting a large force, as well as mitigating its environmental impact. Significant enablers will be required to facilitate early deployment. Some military logistics elements could enhance support in the early stages if Member States are prepared to assist with advanced capacities, such as strategic lift and heavy ground transport. The force will also be required under the Peace Agreement to coordinate non-combat logistics support to the movements.

76. On the basis of the assessment, a military concept of operations has been further developed to perform three core complementary functions, namely, protection, liaison and monitoring, and verification.

77. While all force elements have a role to play in protection, the core of the protection element would be a framework of mobile infantry battalions. One priority would be to provide security to the environs of camps for internally displaced persons, humanitarian supply routes, and nomadic migration routes. Another priority would be to gradually extend security to a wider area, to create conditions conducive to a return to normal community life.

78. Company-level operations on the ground would be fundamental to the achievement of early effects of stabilization. Infantry companies should conduct proactive patrol programmes, using both high-mobility vehicle patrols for greater area coverage and foot patrols around towns and villages to reassure the local population. Armoured personnel carriers would be required to protect troops in high-threat areas but elsewhere low-key patrolling techniques would be used to restore confidence. Patrolling at night would be especially important, using basic night patrolling skills, complemented by night observation equipment. Airmobile patrols by military aviation could also deliver infantry quickly to more remote areas in order to improve security. But the force could not be everywhere and security gaps, with attendant risks to the population, would inevitably exist.

79. Battalions would maintain quick-reaction forces to respond robustly against spoiler activity. Reaction forces would also be maintained at several levels. Those forces would be deployed in armoured or high-mobility vehicles or by military aviation, as the situation required. Air surveillance by fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters could be used to guide reaction forces, provided a robust communications system is deployed for command and control.

80. A peacekeeping force must maintain close liaison at all levels with all stakeholders, including the Government, to conduct mediation, build confidence and gather information. This assumes particular significance, as not all parties are currently signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement. The military liaison capability would consist of dedicated liaison officers, who would maintain close liaison with the parties, tribal leaders, local authorities and communities. The assessment team also concluded that a strong liaison capability would be required for close working relations with the United Nations police; and careful coordination with the humanitarian assistance community to ensure operation synergy. Liaison officers would also be deployed in Chad for coordination between the United Nations agencies and Chadian authorities in the border region.

81. In addition to protection, the United Nations would continue to monitor and verify the security provisions of the Peace Agreement. All force elements will have a role to play but the core of this capability would be provided by air reconnaissance aircraft, ground reconnaissance companies in each sector and United Nations military observers. These elements would monitor and verify compliance with the Agreement, track the activities of armed militias and other armed opposition groups. Reconnaissance companies and United Nations military observers would monitor and report on the dynamic security situation. Their reports would alert commanders to potential threats, thereby driving the patrolling activities of the infantry battalions.

82. The joint assessment carried out by the United Nations and the African Union confirmed that the scale of a United Nations force in Darfur is subject to competing considerations. On the one hand, the size of the force is driven upwards by the requirement to protect civilians, implement the Peace Agreement, cover a large geographical area and be able to deal with spoilers. On the other hand, challenges in deploying and sustaining a large force, as well as its environmental impact, constrain the size of the force and suggest greater use of air and ground mobility. Perceptions are also a key consideration. Concerns about an "occupation force" imply a smaller-scale operation but public expectations of protection militate for a larger one.

83. As indicated above, the assessment team ultimately concluded that the magnitude of the protection task and the need to ensure compliance with the Darfur Peace Agreement would require a large, agile and robust military force. The key operational requirements were defined as high troop density to provide wide area coverage; high mobility to move forces rapidly in response to developing crises; and robust military capability to deter and defeat spoilers. A detailed assessment of the troops needed to perform the tasks has been the starting point of three credible and sustainable military options for the Council. The difference between the options is the level of mobility, troop density and risk that would be accepted regarding the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel and the capacity of the force to fulfil its tasks.

84. **The first option** is based precisely on the "troops to task" assessment undertaken by the United Nations. It calls for a force of approximately 17,300 troops, consisting of 14 infantry battalions, with a divisional reserve of two Special Forces companies, three fixed-wing operational reconnaissance aircraft, up to 8 helicopters for tactical reconnaissance/armed deterrence and 18 military utility helicopters. Up to 200 liaison officers and 300 United Nations military observers

would be deployed, as well as enabling capabilities comprising military engineers, medical, communication, transport and logistic capabilities. Each brigade sector would comprise up to five infantry battalions (total 14), one reconnaissance company (total 3), one rapid reaction and one reserve infantry company (total 6). This force represents an optimal balance of key operational capabilities and probably offers the fastest route to a secure environment and eventual return to normality.

85. **The second option** differs from the first in the number of infantry battalions and military helicopters. It is a force of approximately 18,600 troops, with only four reconnaissance and nine utility helicopters. This option has two additional infantry battalions to compensate for a lower capacity to respond rapidly by air. A smaller aviation element would need to be tasked centrally, reducing flexibility and speed of response. The force would therefore be unable to react to multiple incidents by air, reducing its capacity to deter spoilers and possibly delaying the return to normality and peace. It is the most challenging option to deploy and sustain.

86. **The third option** differs from the first in a reduced number of infantry battalions (total 11), but with six additional helicopters and three additional rapid reaction companies. It is a force of approximately 15,300 troops. This option relies more heavily on rapid reaction forces and the projection of forces by air to meet operational requirements, while sacrificing some security presence. Additional infantry battalions are required if these high-mobility assets cannot be generated. With fewer troops deployed, it carries a higher degree of risk with regard to protection of civilians. It also renders the force more vulnerable to the constraints of weather on operations. It will be slightly faster to deploy and easier to sustain than the other two options.

87. All three options would require an additional temporary surge capacity of one infantry battalion, authorized by the Council as an important element of the multidimensional United Nations operation in Darfur, in order to provide assistance during the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation stipulated in the Peace Agreement. Finally, should the situation in Darfur deteriorate after a United Nations transition, provision should also be made for an enhanced rapidly deployable capacity, over-the-horizon, at the minimum of one further infantry battalion, authorized by the Council at the time of approval of the mandate, in order to reinforce the mission in extremis.

3. Security: police aspects

88. An extension of a United Nations peacekeeping operation into Darfur will require a fully-resourced police component with a robust mandate to provide a strong and credible presence and minimize the difficulties faced by the current AMIS civilian police operations. The United Nations police component will be more effective in its fundamental role of orchestrating long-term developmental changes to law enforcement in Darfur if it is provided with specific authorization in this regard by a Security Council mandate.

89. The concept of operations for a United Nations police component calls for enhanced activity in three broad areas: working with the Government of National Unity and all other parties in the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of law enforcement capacity in Darfur, with particular emphasis on community policing in camps of internally displaced persons; operational support and assistance to all

police agencies to fill capacity gaps; and, in close coordination with the military component of a multidimensional United Nations operation, provision of protection for civilians and a secure environment for the conduct of humanitarian operations.

90. The reform, restructuring and rebuilding of local police capacity will go a long way towards facilitating the full acceptance of national law enforcement agencies throughout Darfur, particularly in areas controlled by the movements and in camps of the internally displaced. However, United Nations police require the support of the parties in order to effect meaningful change and help build law enforcement agencies that meet international democratic standards.

91. The United Nations will initially require deployment of up to 3,300 police officers, and 16 formed police units. This would be a minimum option with a deployment in more than 100 locations, covering about 80 per cent of the population. Recruiting that number of police personnel for the United Nations operation will be a challenge and to facilitate the process it is assumed that a substantial number of AMIS civilian police officers will initially remain in place and serve under a United Nations mandate. However, this will require a process of certification, to ensure that each officer meets United Nations skill set requirements and has received United Nations induction training, or its equivalent.

92. This police option has been developed in close coordination with the military ones, and is based on a clear delineation between military and police tasks. An increase in the strength of one cannot fill the gap created by downsizing the other. Unarmed or lightly armed police cannot be asked to replace military in dangerous situations. Conversely, military forces cannot be asked to replace police capacities in situations of public disorder.

4. Security: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration aspects

93. The role of the United Nations would be to support national institutions and other relevant bodies to implement the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, rather than implementing it directly. This support will be provided through United Nations staff to be based in the field offices located in Al-Fasher, Nyala, Geneina and Zalingei. Technical assistance in areas such as the collection and destruction of weapons and ammunition would be provided by the mission.

94. In particular, support to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process would include monitoring the assembly of combatants; securing disarmament and demobilization sites; undertaking the disarmament of the movements as well as weapons storage and weapons and ammunition destruction; assisting with the registration of disarmed combatants; assisting with demobilization activities; providing and distributing reinsertion packages; and the sustainable reintegration into civilian life of former combatants.

95. It is the Government's responsibility to provide adequate funding and non-military logistics to support assembly of former combatants. Member States will have to support the Government in this important endeavour; the mandate of most United Nations agencies, funds and programmes prohibits them from providing support to combatants in the assembly areas as they are still considered to be members of armed movements. That would necessitate the provision of substantial start-up funds for the expanded mission in order to jump start

disarmament/demobilization operations, as well as the initial discharge and reintegration programmes, which would allow the international community to have some lead time for the mobilization of follow-up resources.

96. In addition to the disarmament programme conducted under the framework of the Darfur Peace Agreement, it would be necessary to support the implementation of a community-based disarmament programme in the region to counter the proliferation of weapons in the hands of civilians and to combat a rise in violent crime engendered by the easy access to weapons.

5. Rule of law and human rights

97. In close cooperation with other United Nations actors, an expanded UNMIS in Darfur would play an essential role in assisting the parties in the implementation of the provisions of the Peace Agreement relating to human rights and the rule of law, with a view to contributing to the creation of an environment conducive to full respect for human rights and the rule of law, where all are ensured effective protection. This would involve a wide range of protection and promotion activities, which will be carried out in keeping with international human rights law and other relevant international standards and in close cooperation and coordination with the parties and while complementing and building on the work carried out by the United Nations country team. Activities with a national scope will be fully consistent with initiatives undertaken in the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Protection and promotion of human rights

98. The human rights component of the mission would carry out a wide range of monitoring, investigation, reporting, advocacy, protection and advisory, as well as capacity- and institution-building activities, including support for the establishment of a national human rights commission in keeping with the Paris Principles, and as noted in the Darfur Peace Agreement.

99. The human rights component of the mission would engage with the national authorities, other parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement, and relevant United Nations and non-governmental organization partners with a view to identifying options for appropriate corrective action to stop, prevent and/or pre-empt violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

100. The monitoring of the human rights situation in the demilitarized zones, areas of displacement and return, and during the process of return, focusing particularly on vulnerable groups, will be a core activity of the human rights protection function, as will be the monitoring of the work of law and order institutions and traditional dispute settlement mechanisms to which full and unhindered access will be essential.

101. The human rights component, in conjunction with other units, would also assist national stakeholders in the capacity-building and development of a transitional justice strategy in accordance with the approaches as set out in the Secretary-General's report on the rule of law and transitional justice (S/2004/616), and will mobilize the provision of international assistance in this critical area.

Rule of Law

102. Taking a complementary approach, rule of law activities would focus on supporting judicial reform, including judicial staff reform through appropriate vetting measures, juvenile and gender justice issues as well as overall legal reform, including strengthening customary law to ensure compliance with international standards. Acknowledging ongoing programmes and comparative advantages of other United Nations actors, targeted efforts would be made to ensure the effective functioning of the courts, the police, and the prosecutorial authorities with a view to ending the climate of impunity. This would also involve assistance in the establishment of mobile courts, the expansion of access to justice and legal aid, the strengthening of traditional forms of justice in keeping with national laws and international human rights standards, and should include the empowerment of the legal profession and civil society. A particular focus on effectively addressing property and land disputes and compensation issues related to the Darfur Peace Agreement will be essential and, in the longer term, may include law reform in these areas.

103. The United Nations Development Programme will scale up its current rule of law programme in Darfur, including its provision of legal aid through its legal aid centres and local lawyers' networks. In addition, UNDP will expand its national capacity-building programme for the Sudanese judiciary, funded by its multi-donor trust fund, to also cover Darfur.

104. In the area of corrections, efforts will be made to provide additional capacity, strengthen, restructure and reform as necessary the prison system as provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement and will require up to 22 United Nations corrections officers seconded from Member States.

6. Protection

105. The civilian protection component of an expanded UNMIS would build on the many tasks it is already carrying out in Darfur, particularly by coordinating and supporting civilian protection actors with the aim of ensuring coherent and comprehensive preventive and responsive action. The protection section would emphasize the full integration of protection issues in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. It would also provide induction and refresher training on protection issues for all UNMIS military and police personnel. The child protection capacity in the unit would provide specific expertise to address issues of reintegration of children adversely affected by the conflict, the situation of children separated from their families, cases of abduction and ending military recruitment of children.

7. Humanitarian assistance, recovery, returns, reintegration and development

106. The substantial progress achieved through the international humanitarian effort in Darfur remains fragile, and the overall humanitarian situation is still extremely precarious. The provision of assistance to a large population dependent on humanitarian assistance in a highly insecure environment, with interrupted humanitarian access in some areas, demands the safeguarding of an incontestably impartial and independent humanitarian space. The humanitarian response must be separate and distinct from any peacekeeping operation to ensure that the provision of assistance is strictly guided by humanitarian imperatives.

107. Both the humanitarian coordination efforts of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the subsequent recovery coordination work of the Resident Coordinator's office will be under the direction of the UNMIS Deputy Special Representative/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. In addition, the mission will need a substantial humanitarian and recovery liaison component at the regional level, as well as sector offices to ensure that the humanitarian, and later the recovery agenda, is put at the forefront of mission operations. Functions of the component will include facilitating communication and coordination on humanitarian and recovery issues within and between the mission, United Nations agencies and the wider humanitarian and recovery communities. The coordination of the relief effort carried out by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations will remain the responsibility of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in support of the Deputy Special Representative/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator.

108. An expansion of existing UNMIS functions dedicated to returns and reintegration in Darfur would be required. Capacity to address this requirement would be established in Al-Fasher, reporting to the Chief of the Returns and Reintegration Unit in Khartoum. Additional capacity would also be established in sector offices, reporting to the regional officer.

109. Return activities will focus on four broad categories of work: coordination, planning, information, and capacity-building. The coordination function will be crucial in ensuring coherence across the various components of the mission (military, police, political and civilian) that will deal with returns and reintegration. Both strategic and operational plans are required for the return itself, as well as working with development partners to ensure that a realistic and sustainable reintegration component is included in the overall recovery plans.

110. While the humanitarian operation in Darfur is instrumental to providing life-saving assistance, early recovery activities in the areas of rule of law and governance, conflict and resource management, and sustainable livelihoods are required urgently to provide the conditions for safe return and sustainable reintegration, and pave the way for sustainable human development. To this end, UNDP will embark on area-based programming that will entail strengthening local government, empowering local communities, and improving access to basic services and natural resources. Given the severe lack of trust, both in State institutions and among communities, confidence-building must underpin all programmatic interventions. Grass-roots activities as much as State-level and national-level interventions must all be geared at raising awareness and promoting reconciliation across ethnic, tribal and political divides.

111. As mentioned earlier, the Darfur Peace Agreement calls for a Joint Assessment Mission, with technical support by the United Nations, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, in collaboration with national counterparts and other key stakeholders. The Joint Assessment Mission was initiated in June 2006 with the understanding that a multitrack approach will be adopted to ensure that needs can best be met in a timely and predictable manner. The first track of the Joint Assessment Mission will focus on early recovery efforts, in particular on the needs of those communities most affected by the conflict. The second track will establish a framework for medium- and long-term reconstruction and development, focusing on infrastructure, structural improvements in services, governance and economic

growth. Although implementation of the Joint Assessment Mission can begin only when the security situation improves, the assessment will be integral to ensuring that recovery, development and reconstruction efforts are timely and can be sustained over the longer term and be responsive to the needs of the people of Darfur. In turn, it will create an important link to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue process by launching an assessment and consultation process in Darfur, which examines the critical socio-economic issues, such as management of natural resources, that underpin the conflict. The multidimensional United Nations operation in Darfur and the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes will be key partners in the Joint Assessment Mission process and its implementation.

8. Gender

112. The gender component of a multidimensional United Nations operation in Darfur would be guided by the mandate set out in Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security in working to ensure the integration of gender equality principles in all the policy and operational activities of the mission. This approach would underline the provision of technical support to various mission components to respond to the identified priorities of women and girls in the sectors of security, protection (particularly physical, legal and social), human rights and political participation.

113. Strong collaboration will be fostered with AMIS in order to further expand its capacity to provide protection to women and girls in Darfur. The gender component will also work in partnership with United Nations agencies and international and national non-governmental organizations to support a review and strengthening of laws relating to gender-based violence; advocate for the harmonization of national laws with international instruments and norms ratified by the Sudan; develop a comprehensive awareness-raising initiative on gender issues and concepts for all incoming peacekeepers, including re-hatted AMIS peacekeepers; facilitate women's access to participation in all humanitarian assistance measures; and ensure the participation of a critical mass of women in all decision-making structures established by the Darfur Peace Agreement, including the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, the Land Commission, the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.

9. HIV/AIDS support

114. Further to Security Council resolution 1308 (2000), the HIV component of a multidimensional operation in Darfur would develop a comprehensive awareness and prevention strategy for peacekeeping personnel, including awareness training for re-hatted AMIS peacekeepers; predeployment training for new troop- and police-contributing countries; and induction, peer education and voluntary counselling and testing, keeping step with troop and police rotations.

115. In addition, the unit will provide technical assistance to integrate HIV issues in mission mandates and functional strategies and collaborate with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, national counterparts and non-governmental organizations in mapping HIV activities and capacity and providing technical inputs to the Joint Assessment Mission. In collaboration with the wider United Nations system, the HIV unit will provide technical support, within the limits of its capacity, to the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority to ensure that HIV is addressed in the

implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the basic services provided to displaced and war-affected populations, in particular the programmes to address gender-based violence. Technical assistance would also be provided to integrate HIV considerations in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities and to support HIV awareness and prevention strategies in the training and capacity-building of community police in camps of internally displaced persons.

10. Mine action

116. Although the landmine threat is low in Darfur, explosive remnants of war and newly laid landmines may exist and result in casualties, particularly among children and returnees. The presence and/or perception of landmines and explosive remnants of war will also affect route access of UNMIS personnel and implementation of humanitarian projects.

117. It would therefore be necessary to have a capacity to conduct clearance and destruction activities in all three Darfur States. All routes to be used by UNMIS as well as humanitarian agencies would require assessment and need to be verified as safe for traffic in Southern and Western Darfur. Re-assessment might be particularly required in Northern Darfur.

118. As the speed of survey, verification and clearance activities is not likely to match the deployment and activities of peacekeeping forces, or the return of displaced populations, mine risk education for United Nations staff working in Darfur and for local populations will be particularly required.

11. Public information

119. The public information component of a multidimensional United Nations operation in Darfur should explain and promote all facets of the United Nations mandate and activities in the region, including with regard to its role in supporting implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, making specific reference to support for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.

120. The public information component would work closely in the development and implementation of information campaigns with the civil affairs component of the United Nations operation and the United Nations country team, as well as other agencies, funds and programmes. It would need to stress the distinction between the role of a United Nations peace operation in the region, its mandate and the work that it will be carrying out, and that of the humanitarian community.

121. The public information effort should plan to have two key means of communicating with target audiences in Darfur: a community outreach and advocacy programme and radio broadcasting. A radio programme would disseminate information about the Darfur Peace Agreement and its implementation, the United Nations and its activities, and otherwise promote the peace process. In order for there to be a United Nations radio capability, the authorities in the Sudan should be urged to expeditiously approve the UNMIS plans for a radio operation throughout the country.

12. Regional dimensions

122. The situation in Darfur has a major impact on regional security and directly affects the countries neighbouring the Sudan, in particular Chad and the Central

African Republic. While the recent normalization of relations between Chad and the Sudan is a welcome development, the regional aspect of the crisis in Darfur continues to be cause for serious concern. By all accounts, illegal cross-border flows of arms and personnel continue, and insecurity prevails in areas close to the border, exposing internally displaced persons and refugees to grave threats to their safety. This is the situation in the Chad-Sudan border area, as well as the Vakaga region of the Central African Republic.

123. In order to ensure that a United Nations operation in Darfur functions with maximum effectiveness, it would be important for UNMIS to have a multidimensional presence in key locations in Chad, including in camps for internally displaced persons and refugees and, if necessary, in the Central African Republic. Those offices, which would also include United Nations military and civilian police, would allow UNMIS to be in close and direct contact with local authorities, as well as other international stakeholders on the ground, so as to monitor major developments in the border area and to coordinate activities where appropriate. If need be, they would attempt to monitor and investigate allegations of border violations and activities on both sides of the border, which can have a destabilizing effect on the border region of both countries. They could also provide the necessary confidence-building mechanisms between the two countries. In this context, I encourage both countries to move forward rapidly towards normalizing relations, which would have a direct and positive effect on the situation in Darfur. In addition, I am encouraged by the efforts of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in coordination with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to look into the possibility of strengthening security arrangements in and around refugee camps in Chad. Obviously, any future United Nations peacekeeping operation in Darfur would have to pay particular attention to the border area and be in a position to increase its activities there, as appropriate.

13. Mission support

124. The introduction of a considerable number of additional troops and/or police elements and civilian staff into the Darfur region of the Sudan will face formidable logistical challenges. As my previous reports have illustrated, the combination of harsh environmental conditions and extremely poor infrastructure in Darfur will considerably complicate deployment and severely limit the United Nations ability to support personnel. In particular, the availability of water for mission personnel will place clear limits on the size of operation that we will be able to support. Geographically situated in the centre of the African continent, and thousands of kilometres from seaports, any future operation in Darfur will present an unprecedented deployment problem.

125. An effective troop presence in Darfur will require the establishment of three sector headquarters in Al-Fasher, Nyala and Geneina to conform to the existing Darfur boundaries. This will necessitate substantial engineering upgrading of work areas, living space, information technology, as well as security arrangements. There is also a need to strengthen the existing command and control structure to include tactical air support assets in support of military operations. The establishment of a subsector headquarters in Zalingei to cater for the specialist requirements of the Jebel Marra area would also be required.

126. Current AMIS operations are located in 34 camps that could be transferred to the United Nations on transition. The camps require major upgrading to United Nations standards in the areas of, inter alia, work and living space, security arrangements, ammunition storage, provision of water, regular maintenance and other areas. The existing equipment in the camps, including the water filtration systems, is worn out, while at some sites the existing water sources are inadequate to support the camps. A careful inventory and accounting of assets in the camps would be mandatory before any transition.

127. An enhanced operational capability of the proposed expanded United Nations mission would also require, as indicated above, a strengthened command and control structure to include the provision of tactical air support accompanied by a robust air operation to manage air assets and establish ground-to-air communications. In addition, the existing United Nations communications systems in Darfur would need to be enhanced from the current reliance on mobile radios fitted into vehicles as the primary voice communication system. A robust multi-mode communications system would be vital for a successful operation, and would require the placement of VSAT terminals, base and mobile radios in both HF and VHF bands, servers, additional computers and specialized support staff to maintain the communications and information technology systems.

128. The Darfur Peace Agreement also calls for logistics support in the establishment of assembly sites for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in consultation with the parties. The probable tasks under this programme will also need a careful assessment and review. The extent of support at the assembly areas remains to be defined and will pose corresponding financial and logistics implications. As indicated in paragraph 95 above, a substantial number of start-up funds for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme would be required from the assessed budget.

129. The full cooperation of Government authorities will be required in areas such as the provision of suitable premises, timely clearance of goods from customs, and removal of all administrative constraints, as well as the overall facilitation of operations. The UNMIS experience has indicated that inordinate and other deliberate delays in the customs clearance of goods can have a major crippling effect on operations.

14. Safety and security

130. A Darfur staff security cooperation mechanism would be established to ensure cooperation among organizations with security capacities in order to promote a safe and secure environment for mandate implementation and programme delivery activities. That mechanism is essential given the United Nations security phase 3 and 4 environment in the Darfur States. The mechanism will be supported by resources from the UNMIS security management system, and would work closely with the Government and other parties concerned.

15. Conduct

131. UNMIS would expand, as required, its comprehensive strategy with regard to the conduct and discipline of United Nations staff to reflect the expansion of the mission in Darfur. That strategy would include special training, public information,

a complaint/investigation system, monitoring and reporting based on interim standard operating procedures.

VII. Observations and recommendations

132. After more than three years of a bitter and savage war among Sudanese factions in Darfur, which has been marked by abhorrent violence against innocent civilians that has shocked the world, the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006 has given hope that the parties may be finally prepared to lay down their weapons and start working together to build a new, peaceful and prosperous Darfur. The Agreement still faces formidable challenges, however. Of immediate concern is that two of the parties involved in the Abuja talks did not sign the Agreement, and that the Agreement has not yet received support from a significant portion of the population in Darfur, particularly among the internally displaced persons and those many others who have been so drastically affected by the conflict. There are still signs that implementation may be experiencing major delays and long-term structural difficulties. There has also been a disturbing escalation of clashes between those who support the Agreement and those who do not. Tragically, it is the long-suffering civilians of Darfur who continue to bear the brunt of this fighting.

133. Despite the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council to extend the signing deadline to 31 May, and attempts to encourage more parties to the conflict to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement, JEM and the Abdelwahid faction of SLM/A remain outside the Agreement. On 7 June, those two factions issued a statement with two other movement leaders, reiterating their non-acceptance of the Agreement and calling on the signatories and other actors to revisit their positions. On 8 June, however, some members of the Abdelwahid faction and JEM splinter groups signed a declaration of commitment, in which they expressed support for the Agreement, and agreed to be bound by its provisions and participate fully in its implementation. A number of non-signatory factions and groups came together on 30 June 2006, at Asmara, to form the National Redemption Front, an umbrella movement which opposes the Darfur Peace Agreement in its present form and demands its adjustment. As mentioned earlier, the National Redemption Front's attack on Northern Kordofan on 3 July represents a worrying escalation of the conflict. I strongly condemn the continuing violence and urge all factions to join the peace process in earnest and without any further delay.

134. In the meantime, the Ceasefire Commission envisaged by the Darfur Peace Agreement met twice in June, and the African Union convened the first meeting of the Joint Commission on 23 June in Addis Ababa. However, both mechanisms have been prevented from making progress by a lack of agreement on the inclusion of the non-signatories.

135. As a result of the ongoing violence throughout Darfur, in particular the recent clashes in Northern Darfur, access to populations in need is decreasing. At the same time, violence against humanitarians is at its highest level yet, and the number of security incidents directed towards humanitarian personnel has been steadily rising since March. Carjackings and other forms of banditry on the roads have increased in all three Darfur States, while in the month of July alone six national humanitarian staff have been killed in the course of their work. This number includes one driver in each Darfur State, and three staff members contracted by UNICEF in Zalingei.

This is in addition to a guard killed in Southern Darfur late in June, and a driver who has been missing since 3 May and is presumed dead; both worked for non-governmental organizations. Two such organizations in Northern Darfur closed their offices as a result of the latter incident. These disturbing developments threaten not only the lives of thousands of relief workers, but also the lifeline they provide to millions of people in Darfur.

136. If these problems are not addressed, the overall situation in Darfur could undergo a reversal. Alternatively, there may be an attempt to implement the Agreement through force, including the forced return of internally displaced persons. If this should be allowed to happen, Darfur could descend into an even bloodier round of conflict that would be catastrophic for the people of the region. No party should use the Darfur Peace Agreement as a pretext for more violence.

137. The signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement has given the parties and the international community a unique chance to avoid that scenario. The parties, in particular the Government, have set themselves challenging targets within the Agreement and must now implement them in earnest and quickly. It should be reiterated here that the Government has the primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens and must mount a credible, transparent, and just effort in this regard. At the same time, the international community has a duty to expand its assistance considerably beyond what has already been provided. As has been agreed by the African Union and the Government, the strengthening of AMIS, including by the United Nations, in the short term is a priority and could be critical to furthering the chances of success of the Peace Agreement and making peace lasting and sustainable in Darfur. I pay tribute to AMIS, which has performed valiantly under the most difficult conditions. The proposal to the Security Council contained in paragraphs 40 to 59 of this report to immediately authorize new levels of United Nations support to AMIS should serve to complement, not substitute, what should be done by the wider international community. If the United Nations is to assist in this effort, the Security Council and the General Assembly would be required to demonstrate flexibility regarding the provision of financing and other support to AMIS from United Nations funding.

138. The urgent strengthening of AMIS may represent an important step towards the lasting settlement of the Darfur crisis. While the Government of the Sudan remains apprehensive of the establishment of a United Nations operation, providing this support to AMIS would be a confirmation of the massive international effort aimed at bringing the conflict to a conclusion. During my recent meeting with President Al-Bashir at the African Union summit in Banjul, I reiterated the full commitment of the United Nations to contributing in a major way to all efforts aimed at bringing an end to the unconscionable violence and suffering in Darfur. In this context, transition towards a United Nations operation is a fundamental tool available to the Sudanese, their Government and the international community, with full regard to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan.

139. I urge the Council to give its full support to the proposals made in this report. AMIS cannot carry out its duties effectively with its current mandate and capabilities. At the same time, the United Nations cannot take over full peacekeeping responsibilities in the region until it has the consent and cooperation of the Government of the Sudan and until it has been able to gather together sufficient contributing nations of goodwill to mount the large multidimensional

peacekeeping operation described in the paragraphs above. The immediate strengthening of AMIS and subsequent transition to a United Nations operation could reverse dangerous threats inherent to peace in Darfur and the region.

140. Securing the consent of the Government of the Sudan will require continuing intensive discussions with Khartoum by Council members, by key Member States and regional organizations, as well as by the United Nations. No effort should be spared to send the simple, powerful message: international involvement will increase the chances of peace taking root in Darfur, will strengthen the credibility of the peace process and the protection of the suffering populations of Darfur. Transition to a United Nations operation should happen as soon as possible, and the international community's message should make clear that the costs of rejecting the transition could be serious and lasting.

141. I believe it appropriate to once again stress that the United Nations has no hidden agenda behind the proposals outlined in this report, beyond the urgent need to help the population and prevent the crisis from spreading further. Future United Nations forces, which would primarily come from African and Asian countries, together with some indispensable support from developed countries, would be deployed to Darfur to assist the parties to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement, not to occupy the country. I appeal to the Sudanese authorities to ensure that the aims and ideals of the United Nations are neither contorted nor misrepresented to suit political ends. For my part, I will continue to actively and pragmatically engage in serious discussions with the Government on all aspects of the United Nations involvement in the Darfur crisis, in order to find mutually acceptable solutions.

142. While urgently seeking to conclude this discussion with the Government of the Sudan, we must also be mindful of the regional dimensions of the crisis in Darfur. Achieving sustainable peace in Darfur will be directly tied to resolving the differences of countries in the region, specifically Chad and the Sudan. While the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries should be applauded, I would like to reiterate my call to the international community to intensify efforts to make borders in that region more secure; and to the Governments of the region to engage in dialogue with neighbours as well as national social and political stakeholders.

143. I have stated before that peace in the Sudan is indivisible. Peace cannot take root in one part of the country while another part remains chronically unstable and prone to extreme violence. The noble ideals which the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army enshrined in the Machakos Protocol of July 2002 and subsequent agreements cannot flourish in a country riven by war and insecurity. In the final analysis, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement cannot be fully successful without peace in Darfur. During its recent visit to the Sudan, the Security Council was told in Juba that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement would be at risk for as long as violence continues in Darfur. At the same time, there is much the protagonists in Darfur can learn through the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Indeed, that Agreement offers observers proof that sustainable peace can thrive and prosper in the Sudan, and that the United Nations could considerably facilitate this. Each peace process is inextricably linked with the other, and both Agreements are critical to the future of the Sudan and for regional stability.

144. I should make clear that both the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Darfur Peace Agreement urgently require unlimited support from the international community. As the international community has pledged considerable sums of money to assist Southern Sudan's recovery from war, so too will Darfur need that support. The lesson from Southern Sudan is that pledges of financial support need to be swiftly followed through if peace is to take root. The international community has already invested in the Sudanese peace processes. It will need to invest a lot more if the Sudan is finally to shake off the vestiges of war and achieve comprehensive peace and development. I urge the international community to make that investment.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 1658 (2006) of 14 February, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) until 15 August 2006, and requested me to report on whether to restructure the mandate of MINUSTAH after the new Government took office, including recommendations for ways in which MINUSTAH can support reform and strengthen key institutions. Drawing on consultations with the elected authorities and key international partners as appropriate, the present report contains such recommendations and provides an update on major developments in the period from 2 February 2006 to 15 July 2006.

II. Major developments

A. Political developments

2. During the reporting period, the most significant political event was the conduct of free and fair national elections, which led to the establishment of a broad-based Parliament and the formation of a multi-party Government, following extensive consultations. Those achievements, which took place in a fragile security environment, reflected the commitment of the Haitian people to a democratic electoral process, and the active and sustained support of MINUSTAH and the international community.

3. Despite the difficulties encountered, the elections were widely regarded as a success, enabling the Haitian population to exercise its vote freely and fairly. For the first time in recent history, the legitimacy of the elections was not contested. Forty-five political parties and 33 presidential candidates competed, and over 60 per cent of registered voters participated in the presidential and first-round legislative elections on 7 February 2006. Turnout in the second round of the legislative elections, which has traditionally enjoyed lower participation, still exceeded 1 million voters.

4. In view of the acute security situation in Port-au-Prince from November 2005 to January 2006, MINUSTAH stepped up its security activities in order to promote

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an environment in which the population could vote in safety. In the run-up to the elections, no significant incidents were reported. On the election day of 7 February, a number of isolated incidents occurred, mainly as a result of the long queues at the polling stations.

5. The potential fragility of the security situation became apparent when street protests erupted on 12 February, after the latest partial results of the presidential election released by the Provisional Electoral Council showed that René Préval's lead had dropped from over 60 per cent to below the 50 per cent threshold required to win the election in the first round. By 13 February, large-scale demonstrations were taking place across the country, causing serious disruption. During that time, the ability of MINUSTAH to maintain a secure and stable environment was stretched to its limits. Roadblocks were erected along all main roads and the airport of Port-au-Prince was temporarily shut. The hotel where the Provisional Electoral Council media centre was located was overrun by protesters and the tabulation centre surrounded by them, forcing both centres to suspend their activities temporarily.

6. On 14 February, after two days of demonstrations and negotiations between the main political actors, the Provisional Electoral Council decided to distribute the unusually high proportion (4.36 per cent) of blank ballots pro rata among all candidates according to the number of votes they had received. On that basis, the Provisional Electoral Council declared Mr. Préval the winner of the presidential election in the first round, with an absolute majority of 51.21 per cent. The procedure and its subsequent result was politically criticized, but not legally challenged, by some of the candidates, including runner-up Leslie Manigat, who had received 12 per cent of the votes.

7. The second round of the legislative election was held in general calm, with only sporadic violence reported. In Grande Saline, however, two voting stations were closed as a result of violent confrontations between supporters of rival political parties, as they had been in February.

8. Pending the holding of run-off parliamentary elections in those localities where either the electoral process was disrupted or appeals were upheld, 27 out of 30 Senators and 88 out of 99 Deputies were duly elected and sworn in on 9 May. Lespwa, President Préval's coalition, won 11 seats in the Senate, followed by the Organisation du peuple en lutte with 4. With 20 seats, Lespwa also leads in the House of Deputies, followed by Fusion with 15 seats. Four Senators and two Deputies are women.

9. Mr. Préval assumed office as President of Haiti on 14 May. In his inaugural speech, he called for dialogue to bring stability to the country. While acknowledging the efforts of MINUSTAH and the international community to date, President Préval affirmed that the country's problems could only be solved by Haitians themselves. Earlier, while addressing the Security Council on 27 March, he had requested that the mandate of MINUSTAH be reoriented in the post-electoral period to focus increasingly on the reform of the police and the judicial system, and on development.

10. Following affirmative votes by the Senate and the House of Deputies, President Préval on 30 May ratified Jacques Edouard Alexis as Prime Minister. On 6 and 7 June, Mr. Alexis appeared before the Senate and the House of Deputies,

respectively, to present his Government's agenda, which concentrated on the modernization of the State and on wealth creation. Mr. Alexis also submitted President Préval's recovery plan, the *Programme d'apaisement social*, to respond to immediate social needs. The Senate approved the Government's agenda and the proposed cabinet members unanimously; the House of Deputies did so with one abstention.

11. In the months preceding his inauguration, President Préval commenced a dialogue with political party and civil society leaders on a 25-year governance and development plan. This was followed by a consultative process which led to agreement on a multiparty Government and the subsequent participation of former opposition party leaders in the President's visits abroad, which reflected a welcome spirit of political diversity. The 18-member cabinet contains representatives from seven political formations: Fusion, Alyans, Movement pour l'instauration de la democratie en Haiti, Fanmi Lavalas, Lespwa, Organisation du peuple en lutte and Union. Five Ministers had served previously, most of them in the same position, during President Préval's first term (1996-2001). Most political sectors have expressed their willingness to support the President's initiatives for dialogue and reconciliation.

B. Security

12. During most of the reporting period, the security situation in Haiti remained generally stable but fragile; early in July, however, it started to deteriorate sharply. While criminal activities by armed groups, in particular kidnappings, had started to decline in the capital in January and February, their levels increased again in June and continued to create an obstacle to the restoration of law and order. Although the number of reported cases remained much lower than the peak registered in December 2005, the increase in acts of violence in the capital, particularly kidnappings and killings, largely dominated public debate and media reports. While a large proportion of the increase in violence is related to common crime, it nonetheless affected the political situation, and prompted increased criticism by political and civil society groups of a perceived inadequate response to the issue by the Government and MINUSTAH. To respond to these developments, MINUSTAH and the Government officials jointly designed an integrated security plan, with increased checkpoints and joint patrols, which was put in place on 10 July. It should be recognized, however, that MINUSTAH, unless it is provided with specialized police capacities, has only a limited capability and mandate to address what is essentially a domestic law enforcement task. Its main contribution will be strengthening Haitian National Police capacity.

13. In Port-au-Prince, in the months following the elections, there were few direct attacks on MINUSTAH, which was interpreted as a unilateral "truce" by the armed gangs. However, the Haitian National Police and MINUSTAH were not able to enjoy full freedom of movement in Cité Soleil. Gangs that did not subscribe to the initial truce appear to have continued their criminal activities in other shantytowns. However, on 29 May, two Haitian National Police officers were killed as they entered Cité Soleil and their corpses mutilated under unclear circumstances. On 4 June, violence broke out between two armed gangs in the Carrefour Feuilles area, leading to the death of at least five people and the destruction of several houses and vehicles. In a sharp turn for the worse, on 7 July, in Martissant, in one of the most

serious atrocities since the establishment of MINUSTAH, gang members attacked residents of a neighbourhood where a rival gang was based, leaving at least 22 people dead, including women and children. Following this, gang activity increased, including killings, kidnapping and attacks on peacekeepers. On 13 July, three peacekeepers from the MINUSTAH Brazilian battalion were shot and wounded by unknown assailants in Cité Soleil. Two of them had to be transferred to a medical facility in the Dominican Republic to undergo appropriate treatment.

14. Other cities and the countryside remained largely quiet, with the exception of the Raboteau shantytown of Gonaïves where rivalry and division among the main gangs have been rising.

C. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

15. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration component of MINUSTAH, working closely with the National Commission for Disarmament, has made considerable progress since February 2006 in pursuing a community-based approach to disarmament with the establishment of community prevention and development committees in three volatile quarters of Port-au-Prince and in three other cities. With a view to countering armed violence, the committees support community discussions with the members of armed groups, including the former military, who expressed an interest in disarmament and community reinsertion but were awaiting clarification of the Government's policies in this respect.

16. The Mission commissioned independent expert analyses of the gang dynamics in Haiti, which will help measure the impact of armed violence on women and the socio-economic options for disarmed elements. The results will provide input for the national dialogue on disarmament, as well as for the planning of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.

D. Haitian National Police reform and restructuring

17. During the reporting period, the ability of the Haitian National Police to act as an effective police force remained limited. On 18 April, Haitian National Police Director General Mario Andrésol announced his determination to pursue vetting of the National Police and affirmed that officers whose actions damaged the force's reputation would be expelled. The police component of MINUSTAH continued to work with the Haitian National Police to bring much-needed improvements to its professional, technical and logistical capacities through co-location in 28 police stations.

18. Selection from among the 33,636 applicants for the eighteenth course at the Police Academy was completed and 578 candidates, including 27 women, started their induction training on 4 June.

19. To date, 5,783 Haitian National Police serving officers, as well as the serial number of their weapons, have been registered. The Mission issued 1,623 weapons donated by the United States of America to the National Police officers who successfully completed the weapons training course. The weapons are tracked through a database system.

20. At the request of the Haitian authorities, MINUSTAH also began to assist with the registration of Haitian security personnel at the National Palace and will assist in their vetting. It will also provide technical advice in the training of a close protection team for the President, which will be supported by a MINUSTAH rapid response team until the Haitian National Police is fully trained.

21. The Haitian National Police reform plan (see S/2006/60, paras. 31-34) was finalized together with the National Police senior management and received preliminary support from the newly elected authorities and bilateral donors. The Director General of the Haitian National Police is expected to submit the plan to the *Conseil supérieur de la police nationale* for endorsement soon.

E. Justice and corrections

22. Little progress was made in addressing structural problems in Haiti's judicial system. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH monitored a number of serious cases in which the course of justice had not been fully respected, owing largely to institutional inadequacies, including the release from detention of Haitian National Police officials suspected of involvement in the Martissant killings (see para. 28 below) and at least one suspected major criminal.

23. The independence of the judiciary remains problematic. The December 2005 Decree establishing the *Conseil supérieur du pouvoir judiciaire* has been widely criticized for leaving the door open for continued Government interference and for having been adopted without prior consultation with professional organizations and civil society. In addition, other legislation important to the independence of the judiciary still remains to be adopted, such as the law on the status of magistrates and the law on the School of Magistrates.

24. In order to help improve judicial practices, MINUSTAH, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other actors, has started a programme to train justices of the peace in various regions throughout the country. In May, MINUSTAH and UNDP also organized a seminar on prolonged pre-trial detention, resulting in the adoption of recommendations by different legal operators in the penal chain. A follow-up working group charged with promoting the implementation of those recommendations met regularly under the auspices of MINUSTAH.

25. Overcrowded prisons, in particular the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, remained a cause for serious concern, with the rate of prolonged pre-trial detention exceeding 90 per cent. Cells in police stations were increasingly being used for detainees on a long-term basis. In April, based on the decisions of the justices of the peace handling the files, the National Penitentiary released approximately 100 inmates who had been detained on different minor charges, in an attempt to reduce overcrowding.

26. The problem was clearly illustrated on the day of President Préval's inauguration, when some 300 detainees held at the National Penitentiary were able to force open their cell doors in protest against the conditions in which they were being held. At the request of the National Prison Authority, MINUSTAH reinforced the Haitian National Police unit present at the scene; following negotiations, the prisoners agreed to return to their cells. On 20 May, another jailbreak was prevented

at the Fort Liberté prison, when a group of inmates managed to break through the prison roof before being apprehended by the prison's sole armed guard.

F. Human rights

27. The human rights situation in Haiti remained a serious cause for concern. Extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, armed robberies, extortion and general intimidation continued. In Port-au-Prince, in particular, armed gangs continued to threaten the population.

28. Although the cooperation between MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police improved, there was no satisfactory conclusion to the investigation of the killings during a Haitian National Police operation at a football match in Martissant on 20 August 2005 (see S/2005/631, para. 36). Carlo Lochard, former Haitian National Police Director of the west region, and Renan Etienne, former Director of the Administrative Police, both arrested on 4 November 2005 for serious errors and omissions in the investigation, were released from detention in March and April, respectively, along with five other former National Police officers, upon instructions of an investigating magistrate.

29. The judicial hearings of former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune and former Interior Minister Jocelerme Privert, as well as those of others accused of involvement in the alleged killings in La Scierie in February 2004 (see S/2004/698, para. 27), commenced at the Gonaïves Court of Appeal on 8 May. Mr. Neptune and former Minister of Justice Calixte Delatour boycotted the proceedings. On 13 May, the Court ordered the provisional release of Mr. Privert but ruled that it was unable to examine the case of Mr. Neptune.

30. In his report to the Commission on Human Rights of 27 March 2006 (see E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1), the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, described as "broadly satisfactory" the response of MINUSTAH to his request for clarifications regarding allegations of serious human rights violations committed by MINUSTAH force elements during an operation in Cité Soleil on 6 July 2005 (see S/2005/631, para. 25).

G. Humanitarian and development situation

31. In an effort to put forward a long-term strategy to reactivate Haiti's economy, President Préval proposed a 25-year governance and development plan, which received wide support (see para. 11 above) . He also engaged in negotiations with countries in the region on economic cooperation and integrated Haiti into PetroCaraïbe, a Venezuelan-led initiative providing, among others, preferential oil prices to Caribbean countries. Despite such initiatives, Haiti continues to suffer from high petrol prices and electricity shortages. With a view to improving the living conditions in Haiti in the short term, in particular access to basic services, including electricity and garbage disposal, and employment generation, President Préval proposed the *Programme d'apaisement social* (see also para. 10 above) and was seeking the rapid disbursement of funds by the international donor community to implement such high-impact and high-visibility projects. There is also a pressing need for funds to meet salary arrears for a large number of civil servants.

32. At the High-level International Meeting on Haiti held in Brasilia on 23 May, participants discussed the results of the Interim Cooperation Framework, including the funding status. Donors reported that between July 2004 and March 2006 approximately 90 per cent of the 2004 pledges, or $964 million, had been disbursed, that is, transferred to the Government of Haiti and executing partners, but not necessarily spent. Approximately 80 per cent of the disbursed funds reportedly covered development expenditures and the remainder covered budgetary support. Such sectors as agriculture, roads and transportation, and the improvement of shantytowns have yet to receive some of the funding pledged in 2004. Assessing the impact of the Framework on the living conditions of the Haitian population has proved challenging owing to the lack of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism and the absence of adequate information management.

33. In Brasilia, donors also reiterated their support for the extension of the Framework through December 2007, and made a commitment to redirect its focus to bring it in line with President Préval's priority to address short-term emergency needs and to support the *Programme d'apaisement social*. Under the auspices of the United Nations Resident Coordinator, donors formed a *Comité de partenariat* with the Government to ensure that, under the Framework's extension, donor activities would be aligned with, and supportive of, the Government's priorities. Participants in Brasilia also took note of the possibility that a United Nations transitional appeal might be launched to support the main objectives of the *Programme d'apaisement social* and to present proposals for funding institutional and capacity-building activities. The appeal is expected to be launched in early September and will target non-traditional donors for Haiti.

34. The United Nations contingency plan for the upcoming hurricane season was updated and MINUSTAH established a joint operations coordination centre to support the United Nations system's disaster response. The Mission also trained Government focal points at national and regional levels, as well as the chiefs of regional offices in response coordination, thereby enhancing the Government's early warning and response capacity in the event of an emergency or natural disaster. These activities were coordinated with a UNDP project, aimed at building the Government's risk and disaster management capacity.

35. The forced repatriation of Haitian nationals from the Dominican Republic, many of whom had no means to support themselves, continued at a monthly rate of between 1,500 and 2,000 persons. On 19 May, MINUSTAH met with Government officials, representatives of the United Nations country team and non-governmental organizations in the border town of Belladere to establish a local reception committee and prepare an action plan, including a MINUSTAH-funded quick-impact project for a reception centre. The Mission coordinated the response to the forced repatriation of approximately 400 Haitians at the border post of Anse-à-Pitre at the end of March by dispatching assessment teams and mobilizing local authorities and non-governmental organizations to respond through the provision of transportation or travel grants.

H. Activities of the United Nations country team

36. The United Nations country team continued the implementation of its mandated activities in areas such as food aid to vulnerable populations, rehabilitation of schools, legal aid for children at odds with the law, psychosocial assistance to women and girl victims of sexual violence, HIV/AIDS prevention, distribution of medical equipment and electricity generators, technical assistance to farmers and employment generation, in particular in the slum areas of the capital and in the regions. In addition, UNDP was instrumental in managing donor funds for the electoral process.

37. Overall delivery by the United Nations country team during the first quarter of 2006 was estimated at $11 million, over 85 per cent of which was disbursed outside of the capital or for activities with nationwide coverage, in particular in the area of food security, health, rehabilitation of infrastructure, short-term employment generation and environmental protection. It is estimated that these programme activities generated more than 250,000 person days of short-term employment, in particular for youth.

38. The stabilization of the security situation in the capital following the elections made it possible for humanitarian and development actors to reach out to the groups most affected by the chronic emergency conditions. In Cité Soleil, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization/Pan American Health Organization carried out a vaccination campaign for children and provided school equipment while the World Food Programme continued to provide food aid. The United Nations country team task force for Cité Soleil, comprising representatives of MINUSTAH, donors and non-governmental organizations, was established to coordinate the conduct of assessment missions to, and interventions in, the shantytown. Four United Nations inter-agency assessment missions had already been carried out in the sectors of health, education, infrastructure, and water and sanitation. Following the assessment, three projects in the areas of water and sanitation and natural disaster prevention were approved for funding from the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund for under-funded emergencies.

39. It should, however, be recognized that the overall impact of the efforts of the humanitarian and developmental actors — within and outside the United Nations system — has been insufficient to produce a tangible improvement in the living situation of the Haitian people, to create jobs and ensure the delivery of basic services.

III. Post-electoral role of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

40. The notable political progress over the past months and the formation of a democratically elected leadership provide a unique opportunity for Haiti to emerge from a cycle of instability and violence towards recovery and development. In particular, the "political restructuring" that resulted in a realignment of the political forces of the 1990s could help overcome Haiti's acute political and social divisions and could represent a key step in the country's transition towards a stable, constitutional and prospering democracy.

41. The incoming Haitian authorities have presented an ambitious programme for the next five years, concentrating on the modernization of the State and the strengthening of democratic institutions, as well as on wealth creation, including through the encouragement of private investment. The realization of this programme will ultimately depend on the Haitians. However, further sustained and generous international assistance will be essential for the Haitian people and their new leadership to succeed.

42. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1658 (2006), a thorough assessment of the mandate of MINUSTAH was carried out, involving extensive exchanges between MINUSTAH and United Nations Headquarters, as well as with relevant international partners. The review process culminated with a visit to Haiti in June by a team representing all relevant United Nations entities that, together with MINUSTAH, discussed with the Haitian authorities and other actors an appropriate role for MINUSTAH in the post-electoral period.

43. In order for the international community's support to the Haitian authorities to be optimized, and given the magnitude of the problems facing Haiti, a clear division of labour among all relevant actors is needed, taking into account the comparative advantage of each. As a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, MINUSTAH has a distinct and unique contribution to make through the activities of its troops and police officers, its countrywide presence and logistical assets and the legitimacy provided to it by its Security Council mandate.

44. In the first area of priority for the new Government — the modernization of the State — MINUSTAH should focus on supporting the institutions in the rule-of-law sector and the State administration, in particular outside Port-au-Prince where MINUSTAH personnel often represent the biggest and sometimes the only international presence and where the local authorities are weak or largely non-existent.

45. In the second area of priority — economic reactivation — MINUSTAH can make the best contribution by continuing to ensure a secure and stable environment, where Haitians, together with international actors, are able to pursue their activities in safety. This would also provide the enabling environment for MINUSTAH to support the Haitian National Police reform process and the reform of the judicial and prisons systems.

46. Ample international assistance will be required if the new authorities are to succeed in pursuing the far-reaching programme of social and economic development, which they consider indispensable to the country's lasting stability. The Mission will make available its limited assets, such as engineering units, to facilitate development activities within the limits of its mandate, operational requirements and resources. In addition, the components of MINUSTAH that focus on cross-cutting issues, such as human rights, gender, child protection and HIV/AIDS, will work to ensure the mainstreaming of such matters in the mandate implementation of the Mission.

47. Making use of the comparative strengths of MINUSTAH (see paras. 43-45 above) responds to the explicit request of the Haitian authorities as the proposed MINUSTAH activities are aligned with, and supportive of, national priorities.

48. My Special Representative will play a key role by working closely with the Haitian leadership to support its efforts to reform the rule-of-law institutions, to

supporting the Government has potential to increase or ignite tensions over the coming months, creating a fertile ground for anti-democratic forces to attempt destabilization.

54. Drug and arms trafficking continues to represent a serious underlying destabilizing factor; it feeds gang criminality, engenders corruption and undermines efforts to strengthen the rule-of-law institutions and reduce armed violence. Haiti's porous land and sea borders allow for almost unimpeded trans-shipment of narcotics and trafficking in weapons and munitions. The Haitian State has only very limited capacity to address gang and cross-border trafficking activities. While MINUSTAH, in consultation with the Haitian authorities and within its limited capabilities, can take some measures to endeavour to deter these activities, these alone will be insufficient. Bilateral assistance from key member States possessing the needed technical capabilities will be crucial to enable the Haitian leadership to address these challenges, which negatively affect the peacebuilding efforts, in a meaningful way. In the case of gang criminality, MINUSTAH would require technical expertise to be able to better support the development of the prevention and response capacity of the Haitian National Police. With regard to cross-border trafficking control, direct engagement by capable member States with the Haitian authorities would be needed.

55. Accordingly, creating and maintaining a secure and stable environment will remain a key task of MINUSTAH, in order to provide an enabling context in which the national priority programmes, including humanitarian and development activities, can be implemented in safety. To this end, MINUSTAH will work closely with the Haitian authorities to pursue appropriate security measures and to pave the way for an environment that will permit the Haitian National Police to gradually assume full responsibility for ensuring security.

56. In the post-electoral period, MINUSTAH troops and formed police units will continue to be tasked to provide a deterrent security presence throughout the country by patrolling in towns and their surroundings, protecting key installations, protecting United Nations personnel and facilities, providing operational support to the Haitian National Police and MINUSTAH police operations, and facilitating the access of humanitarian workers to the Haitian people in need. Protecting civilians under imminent threat, within the Mission's capabilities and areas of deployment, will also remain a key task. However, as described above, main factors that destabilize security are gang violence and kidnappings. Without significant added specialized police capacities, the ability of MINUSTAH to respond to crime, as distinct from containing or deterring it and protecting civilians in danger, is limited.

57. In addition, an enhanced security presence at key land border crossing points and selected ports will be required to assist in extending State authority. Continued or even increased MINUSTAH support to the Haitian coast guard will be necessary to deter and respond to illicit activities in the coastal areas. In meetings with my Special Representative, President Préval has expressed concern about specific issues such as smuggling and the lack of proper customs administration in Haiti and has requested increased technical assistance from MINUSTAH military and police components.

58. To fulfil these responsibilities, MINUSTAH troops will continue to be deployed in all 10 regions of the country and will require some additional specific capacities. One hundred additional engineering personnel (together with 10 dump

trucks) are necessary to augment the current capability of MINUSTAH engineering units and to enable the simultaneous operation of heavy engineer equipment already deployed. Twenty additional military police would be required to support the increased investigative workload and to provide additional security escorts. Finally, following a reduction in the contingent supplied aviation capabilities of MINUSTAH, it will be essential to deploy sufficient aviation assets allowing the Mission to maintain its current airlifting capacity.

59. Given the many uncertainties outlined above and the fragility of the overall security situation, the force strength should be kept at the currently authorized ceiling of 7,500 troops. While the actual deployed strength has dropped following the withdrawal, pursuant to resolution 1608 (2005), of one battalion and the closure of the Port-au-Prince sector headquarters, retaining the 7,500 ceiling would give the Mission sufficient flexibility to be able to swiftly deploy additional troops should changes in the security situation require reinforcements. In addition, the 7,500 troop ceiling would allow for the deployment of the special capabilities mentioned above, which are essential for mandate implementation.

60. Together with the military, MINUSTAH formed police units will take on an enhanced crime prevention role by increasing substantially their patrolling in support of the Haitian National Police in Port-au-Prince, Cap Haïtien and Gonaïves. For this purpose, MINUSTAH will need to retain its eight formed police units, which represents a total of 1,000 officers. To enhance the ability of MINUSTAH to deliver operational support to the Haitian National Police, in view of the rising gang violence, at least half of these formed police units would need to include personnel and equipment qualified for special weapons and tactics (SWAT).

61. As the Haitian National Police progressively builds up its capacity to discharge primary security functions, a corresponding downsizing of international security components could be envisaged. However, it is crucial that this process be undertaken with due attention to the need to avoid a security vacuum that could result in a rapid reversal of achievements.

Support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and violence reduction

62. Despite incremental advances in community-based violence reduction, little or no progress has been achieved so far in furthering traditional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as the policies of the Transitional Government were not conducive to successful disarmament. With the installation of the new leadership, new possibilities for progress could open up with regard to the former military, non-certified Haitian National Police officers and gang members. The newly elected authorities have identified disarmament as an area of importance but are still in the process of defining their policy on the matter.

63. The expertise and resources of MINUSTAH should be retained to assist the Haitian authorities in developing and implementing a coherent disarmament and violence reduction programme. An area of particular focus could be to address the predictable impact of police vetting and certification by means of devising, in consultation with relevant partners, a relevant reintegration and retraining programme. Other interventions could aim at placing weapons beyond use in the context of strengthening community security through a programme that, in conjunction with the *Programme d'appaisement social*, addresses the different

needs of various target groups, including armed groups, gangs, and youth and women associated with armed groups. The programme could also support the strengthening of the legal framework related to the control and movement of small arms.

B. Support to the establishment of the rule of law

Strengthening the security capacity of Haiti

64. The credibility and effectiveness of the Haitian National Police continue to be limited owing to technical and institutional shortcomings. Popular confidence in the Haitian National Police has been shaken by criminal behaviour and the brutality of some of its members. In general, the Haitian National Police is understaffed, inadequately trained and suffers from a lack of discipline and respect for the command structure. It is also infiltrated by criminal elements.

65. To address these shortcomings, a draft Haitian National Police reform plan was prepared jointly with the Haitian authorities, pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1608 (2005) and 1658 (2006). Once officially endorsed (see para. 21 above), the Haitian National Police reform plan is expected to guide the activities of the national and international stakeholders in the upcoming years. The support of MINUSTAH to the Haitian authorities will need to go hand in hand with sustained and concerted international assistance, in particular in the area of capital investments. Strong political support for the reform efforts will be required to counter the resistance that the process is likely to generate.

66. The Haitian National Police reform plan identifies the anticipated size and standards of the Haitian National Police and outlines an implementation timetable and required resources. The plan indicates that essential policing functions in Haiti could be discharged by a service of 12,000 well-trained and well-equipped officers. This figure could be achieved in five years at a rate of 1,500 new officers per year, depending on the training capacity (trainers, facilities, equipment and candidates) and the number of officers excluded from the police through the vetting process or through attrition. Key institutional capacities within the Haitian National Police would be strengthened as a priority, including the offices of the Inspector General and the Director General, the judicial police, and the training, administration and general services functions. In parallel, it is anticipated that the vetting of current personnel will be conducted over the course of the first two years after the adoption of the plan. The plan also foresees the creation of a "forum", in which representatives of different areas of Haitian society and the international community could discuss the new Haitian National Police standards for recruitment, training, and career development. From the point of view of personnel expenditures, the national budget is expected to be able to cover the Haitian National Police increase. The budget allocation for capital investments, however, is insufficient and will thus need to be covered by external sources.

67. In addition, the plan indicates that between 18,000 and 20,000 officers would be required to implement the full range of security sector responsibilities in Haiti. To this end, the plan foresees the need for a supplementary strategy that will outline the development of specialized capabilities, including border and coastal monitoring, fire fighting and response capabilities to serious security threats.

68. The MINUSTAH police component plans to adjust its focus in order to better assist the Haitian authorities in reforming and restructuring the Haitian National Police, while continuing to support the Haitian National Police in the maintenance of law and order. The Mission will thus engage in a programme of monitoring, mentoring and field training at the level of Haitian National Police stations as well as commissariats. Furthermore, drawing upon the Mission's human rights and judicial expertise, MINUSTAH will support the institutional strengthening of the Haitian National Police, and the training of Haitian National Police officers. Particular emphasis will be placed on the vetting process, which will be conducted by 50 investigative teams, each composed of one MINUSTAH and one Haitian National Police officer, supported by expertise from the MINUSTAH human rights section. In order to assist the Haitian National Police in the areas outlined by the reform plan, the current authorized strength of MINUSTAH police, as per resolution 1608 (2005), will need to be enhanced by deploying an additional 54 officers with specialized skills in the areas of investigation, database programming, engineering, finance, communication systems and training.

69. Given the serious practical security challenges facing the Haitian National Police, in particular the gang violence in Port-au-Prince, the vetting and training will be targeted and prioritized in a way to achieve maximum impact on the crime situation, in particular in the capital. The Mission will also need experts in counter-kidnapping and anti-gang operations in order to provide specialized advice to strengthen the Haitian National Police capacity to address these most serious crime threats.

Support for the justice and prisons systems

70. The sustainability and ultimate success of efforts to reform and restructure the Haitian National Police will require parallel concerted efforts to tackle the shortcomings affecting the justice and prisons systems. Establishing and strengthening effective and transparent institutions that can ensure that the judiciary is sufficiently resourced, adequately trained, independent and professional is one of the greatest challenges facing the new authorities. Strong commitment by the Haitian authorities, judiciary and civil society, supported by the international community, is needed to meet the challenge. In this connection, revision by the Haitian authorities of relevant legislation will be essential to lay a foundation for effective reform; key legal texts include the *Code d'instruction criminelle* and the *Code pénal*, as well as the decrees and laws establishing the *Conseil supérieur du pouvoir judiciaire*, the *Statut de la magistrature*, the *Ecole de la magistrature* and the organization of the Ministry of Justice.

71. Greater international community support and a more active role by MINUSTAH, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1608 (2005), will be indispensable for the enhancement of the justice system. With enhanced resources, MINUSTAH could provide qualified experts to serve as a professional resource to be drawn upon on a day-to-day basis by the Ministry of Justice and other key justice institutions, such as the Judicial Inspection, the State Prosecutors, the *Conseil supérieur du pouvoir judiciaire* and the *Ecole de la magistrature*. Together with the long-term assistance being provided by UNDP, these additional resources could assist the Ministry of Justice in developing a comprehensive plan for the reform and institutional strengthening of the justice sector. The Mission could also assist in

strengthening strategic policy and planning, legislative, budget and administrative functions.

72. Furthermore, in fighting organized crime and corruption, the Haitian authorities could draw upon these professional resources, who could provide assistance and advice to special dedicated chambers within the court system for serious crimes, should the authorities choose to pursue such a mechanism. With its specialized expertise and capacities in the human rights, police and public information fields, MINUSTAH could facilitate efforts to improve access to justice, an inclusive dialogue on justice-related issues and training on police-justice cooperation.

73. The extent to which qualified legal experts from MINUSTAH could serve as a professional resource for the relevant Haitian judicial authorities and the scope of their work depends on the acceptance and willingness of the Government of Haiti, which retains full legal authority in the judicial sector.

74. Support to the efforts of the Haitian authorities to address the shortcomings of the prison system could be provided through the deployment of 16 correction officers seconded from Member States to address the most urgent problems. Through a mentoring programme, these experts could assist in strengthening national capacity to address key security issues in all prisons, including contingency planning, audit and inspection, prisoner management and human resources management. Together with UNDP, MINUSTAH could also facilitate a process to strengthen national capacity to reduce prisoner deaths and increase levels of health by providing adequate care.

75. It will remain essential to find short-term mechanisms to address prison overcrowding and prolonged pre-trial detention. Should the Haitian authorities choose to establish a reorganized advisory commission on detentions, MINUSTAH could provide technical support as required.

76. Furthermore, if given a more active mandate in the justice sector, the Mission could be a resource for the Haitian authorities to facilitate coherence in the support provided by donors.

C. Supporting democratic governance and strengthening State institutions

77. As noted above, remarkable progress has been achieved by the Haitian political leaders and people, with MINUSTAH support, in creating a level of mutual collaboration that has rarely existed. The newly elected leadership has indicated its strong commitment to continuing this process, which it must lead. The Mission stands ready to continue to assist the Haitian authorities in this work, as requested, once they have decided on the modalities and institutions they will set up for the dialogue and reconciliation process.

78. The holding of the national elections represented a decisive, yet initial step towards the consolidation of democratic institutions at all levels. It will be essential that the current electoral cycle be completed with the holding, as soon as feasible, of the local and municipal elections, as well as the outstanding run-off legislative elections. Adequate financial support for the organization of those elections from donors and the Haitian authorities remains a prerequisite for their success.

79. The Mission will continue to provide operational assistance and policy advice to the Provisional Electoral Council to complete the current electoral cycle. Once these elections have taken place, the new Government will need to enhance the operational structures to support a permanent electoral management body, as well to keep the voters roll updated and further develop the national capacity to organize future elections. Elected local authorities will soon need to vote for municipal and departmental assemblies. International assistance for such post-electoral activities, above all from bilateral and regional partners, such as the Organization of American States and the Caribbean Community, could be complemented with MINUSTAH and UNDP assistance, should the Haitian authorities so request.

80. Support will also be urgently needed for the newly elected officials at the central and local levels, who will have inherited weak institutions that suffer from a lack of qualified personnel, insufficient infrastructure and limited budgetary and material resources. This will require a concerted effort between the Haitian authorities and the international community. The Mission could assist the new authorities in these endeavours, including by providing specialized expertise in regional offices and by continuing its support for small-scale quick-impact projects, which over the post-electoral phase will remain an essential tool in support of mandate implementation. In particular, together with UNDP, it could support the executive branch, both at the central and local levels, such as the *Délégués départementaux* and mayors, once elected, in its efforts to reform the public service, and promote de-concentration, good governance practices and service delivery through a decentralization process. Through the establishment, together with UNDP, of a parliamentary liaison office in the capital, MINUSTAH will be able to provide hands-on assistance to parliamentarians. Furthermore, following specific requests made by the President and his team, MINUSTAH is exploring ways to make available to the executive branch international advisers who could provide technical assistance regarding the implementation of policy priorities. In order to help the executive branch extend its authority countrywide, MINUSTAH assets should, within the limits of the Mission's mandate and operational requirements, be put at the disposal of the President and the country's most senior officials.

81. Haiti's instability, severe socio-economic challenges, vulnerability to natural disasters and advanced environmental degradation hamper political and security efforts to stabilize the country. These challenges demand long-term sustainable solutions, including effective mechanisms for disaster management and human protection. The Mission and the United Nations country team will build and reinforce mechanisms that will help improve the Government's capacity for strategic planning (including development planning), process management, monitoring and regulation of basic service delivery at national and local levels.

D. Support for human rights

82. The human rights component of MINUSTAH, which also represents the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in the country, will discharge and coordinate core human rights functions and help mainstream human rights across all MINUSTAH activities. With enhanced resources, it could provide more comprehensive and effective support to police and justice reform, including by assisting the vetting process and providing a diagnostic basis for those reform processes through the monitoring of human rights-related issues. In consultation

with the Haitian authorities, MINUSTAH will also seek to identify mechanisms to address serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, with a particular focus on emblematic cases. To achieve these objectives, the Mission will combine enhanced monitoring of rule-of-law institutions, investigation and analysis, capacity-building for Haitian institutions and groups (together with the United Nations country team), public advocacy and provision of advice on human rights issues.

83. With a view to supporting the national capacity for human rights protection and promotion, and advisory services, MINUSTAH will provide training and assistance to the *Office du protecteur du citoyen*, as well as to civil society organizations focusing on human rights issues. Targeted support to the executive and legislative branches will also be made available by means of informational activities on international human rights law and protection systems, provision of advice on ratification of key human rights instruments and revision of key legislation, as well as training on methods and techniques of reporting to international human rights bodies. The Mission will benefit from consultancy support from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to pursue wider activities aimed at promoting human rights in support of the Mission's mandate.

84. The Mission will continue to promote the participation of women in all relevant spheres of activity by supporting capacity-building initiatives and providing technical advice to relevant organizations. Together with UNICEF, MINUSTAH will also provide support for the strengthening of the legal framework pertaining to children's rights and child protection. To this end, MINUSTAH will provide capacity-building to relevant Ministries, judicial actors and the Haitian National Police.

IV. Mission support

85. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH provided extensive logistical support for the national elections in February and April. The Mission was required to reallocate its human and material resources in order to ensure a comprehensive logistical network throughout the country. While the MINUSTAH 2005/2006 budget did not anticipate the extent of logistical support that would need to be provided by the Mission, relevant expenses were nevertheless absorbed from within available resources. The Mission also undertook limited road rehabilitation projects in line with its operational requirements.

V. Financial aspects

86. By its resolution 60/18 B of 30 June 2006, the General Assembly decided to appropriate a total amount of $489,207,100, equivalent to $40,767,258 per month, for MINUSTAH for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. Should the Security Council approve the recommendations set out in section III of the present report, additional resources for the period up to 30 June 2007 would be sought from the General Assembly at its sixty-first session.

87. As at 30 April 2006, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSTAH amounted to $66.8 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,639.9 million.

88. As at 30 April 2006, amounts owed to troop and formed police contributors to MINUSTAH totalled $9,148.4 million. Reimbursement of troop and contingent-owned equipment costs have been made for the period up to 30 April 2006, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

VI. Observations and recommendations

89. With the successful completion of the national elections, a new page in the history of Haiti has been turned. Today, the people of Haiti have a unique opportunity to break the cycle of violence and poverty and move towards a future of stable and peaceful development. In this, they will be guided by a new leadership which emerged from a free, fair and inclusive electoral process, conducted in safety and dignity. President Préval has shown a commendable determination to reach out to all political and social forces in Haiti in a spirit of reconciliation and dialogue, leaving behind decades of tension and exclusion. The appointment of a broad-based Government under Prime Minister Alexis and the adoption by the Haitian authorities of an ambitious, yet balanced, policy agenda have laid the foundation for Haiti's recovery and renewal. The implementation of the reform agenda — the modernization of the State and wealth creation — could benefit from an enhanced partnership with the international community, including MINUSTAH and the United Nations country team. Ultimately, however, the Haitian authorities and the people will need to actively take ownership of that agenda in order to ensure its lasting success.

90. The needs of the country remain vast and the challenges immense. The security situation continues to be worrying and destabilizing, in particular the crime situation in the capital, as the sources of instability still exist and the national security capacity to address them remains inadequate. Illicit trafficking in weapons and drugs remains an obstacle to successfully fighting crime, impunity and corruption. The institutions of the State, including the Haitian National Police, the judicial system and the institutions of government, require extensive assistance in order to function appropriately at all levels. An inclusive country-wide dialogue with all political and social forces will need to be nurtured continuously in order to consolidate advances achieved so far. Poverty reduction and socio-economic development are important priorities, as are rapid and visible improvements in the daily lives of the Haitians.

91. At present, Haiti cannot address those challenges all by itself. International partners should therefore extend timely, adequate and coherent support to the new authorities in the above-mentioned areas. As reflected in section III of this report, MINUSTAH, as part of an international division of labour, stands ready to offer the Haitian authorities targeted assistance, based on its comparative advantages, in the following two areas: ensuring a secure and stable environment to allow the ongoing political process to continue and humanitarian and development work to be conducted in safety; and providing institutional support to rule of law reform and to institutions of governance, in particular at the regional and local levels. All these

efforts will be underpinned by the human rights work of the Mission and a political role for my Special Representative, including through his good offices. In addition, MINUSTAH will provide support for the organization of the remaining elections, which should be held as soon as feasible. Enhanced MINUSTAH resources will be required to implement those activities, as indicated in section III.

92. In particular, the MINUSTAH police need to be strengthened with SWAT-qualified personnel and equipment, as part of its formed police units, as well as with expert advisers in counter-kidnapping and anti-gang operations, as part of its police contingent, to better support the Haitian National Police. This qualitative strengthening is needed since gang violence and kidnappings have emerged as an overriding impediment to stabilization in Haiti. They block the sustainable implementation of institutional strengthening, poverty reduction and economic development programmes by the Haitian authorities and donors, and are a serious obstacle to normal economic activity and productive investment.

93. It is important to recognize that there are limitations to this mandate. While the Mission intends to maximize its crime prevention role, it will not be able to respond to criminality in an exhaustive manner. Neither will the MINUSTAH security presence at border crossings and selected ports and crossroads be sufficient to fully deter illicit activities, including the trans-shipment of drugs and weapons. I therefore call upon the international community, in particular those with close relations to Haiti and its people, to come together in a unified fashion to complement the activities of MINUSTAH in areas where it does not have capacity or mandate and to work closely with MINUSTAH in those areas where it does. I would welcome in particular the involvement of regional partners, such as OAS and CARICOM. New opportunities may open up in this regard now that Haiti has found its place again among the countries of the Caribbean Community.

94. I also appeal to the Haitian authorities to take full advantage of the assistance offered by the international community and, drawing upon MINUSTAH support as required, to help further reforms by adopting key national policies, such as the Haitian National Police reform plan, key legislation related to the independence of the judiciary, a disarmament policy and priorities in the areas of dialogue and reconciliation. The Haitian authorities should make maximum use of the expertise and support available from MINUSTAH for the strengthening of the rule of law sector.

95. Now that an elected government and legislature are in place, the new authorities should be given adequate means to succeed, including for the organization of the outstanding elections. I therefore call on donors to provide urgent and generous support to the Haitian authorities, in particular in the context of the pledging conference held in Port-au-Prince on 25 July, especially to address those short-term socio-economic requirements that are indispensable for the continuing stability of the country given the high expectations of the people. At the same time, I would like to stress that pledges and disbursements are only a first step. Rapid implementation of development projects bringing visible relief to the Haitian people is essential. Job creation and delivery of basic services should be a key aim. The United Nations system stands ready to assist the Haitian authorities and donors to establish a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to facilitate the coordination of their efforts.

96. The United Nations reiterates its commitment to the Haitian authorities to assist with the implementation of national priorities. In order to enable MINUSTAH to do so effectively, I recommend that the Security Council approve the proposals regarding the mandate and resources of MINUSTAH set out in section III above and extend the Mission for a period of at least 12 months. This is the minimum time needed to establish a solid basis for rule of law reform, achieve some initial results and progress towards democratic governance, in particular at the local level. It would also send an important signal to the Haitian people of the enduring commitment of the international community. The Mission's military strength will need to be maintained at the current ceiling of 7,500 troops and the police strength augmented by 54 individual police officers for institutional support, which brings the total strength to 1,951. Furthermore, 16 seconded corrections officers are required to adequately discharge the responsibilities of MINUSTAH in the prison system.

97. The United Nations is grateful for the continuing engagement of troop- and police-contributing countries. Their engagement will need to be sustained and further augmented in the area of police with additional francophone officers possessing specific skills to support the reform of the National Police, as well as with specialized capacities to enhance the ability of MINUSTAH to deliver advice, training and operational support to the Haitian National Police in the fight against gang violence and kidnappings. The unwavering support of members of the Core Group, donors and regional organizations will remain equally important for MINUSTAH to succeed in its challenging mission.

98. Finally, I would like to extend my warm appreciation to Juan Gabriel Valdés, who served as my Special Representative until the end of May and whose remarkable political vision and inspiration were crucial to enabling credible and inclusive elections in Haiti. I would also like to welcome my new Special Representative, Edmond Mulet, and express my gratitude to him and to all MINUSTAH personnel for their dedication, perseverance and commitment to peace and security in Haiti, while carrying out their tasks in often dangerous and demanding circumstances.

Annex I

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti: countries providing military staff and contingents (as at 15 July 2006)

Country	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*
Argentina	9	549	558
Bolivia	1	—	1
Brazil[a]	14	1 200	1 214
Canada	4	—	4
Chile	8	537	545
Croatia	1	—	1
Ecuador	1	66	67
France	2	—	2
Guatemala	5	80	85
Jordan	11	749	760
Morocco	2	0	2
Nepal	7	750	757
Paraguay	3	—	3
Peru	4	205	209
Philippines	2	155	157
Sri Lanka	12	950	962
United States of America	4	—	4
Uruguay	11	967	978
Total	**101**	**6 208**	**6 309**

[a] Including the Force Commander.

Annex II

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti: countries providing civilian police officers and formed police units (as at 15 July 2006)

Country	*Civilian police officers*	*Formed police units*	*Total*
Argentina	4	—	4
Benin	29	—	29
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	—	4
Brazil	4	—	4
Burkina Faso	71	—	71
Cameroon	41	—	41
Canada[a]	68	—	68
Chad	20	—	20
Chile	27	—	27
China	5	125	130
Egypt	7	—	7
El Salvador	4	—	4
France	78	—	78
Ghana	11	—	11
Grenada	1	—	1
Guinea	38	—	38
Jordan	2	290	292
Madagascar	1	—	1
Mali	13	—	13
Mauritius	1	—	1
Nepal	13	125	138
Niger	21	—	21
Nigeria	10	125	135
Pakistan	—	248	248
Philippines	42	—	42
Romania	4	—	4
Russian Federation	8	—	8
Senegal	47	84	131
Sierra Leone	2	—	2
Spain	28	—	28
Togo	5	—	5
Turkey	12	—	12
United States of America	47	—	47
Uruguay	6	—	6
Vanuatu	3	—	3
Yemen	3	—	3
Zambia	9	—	9
Total	**690**	**997**	**1 687**

[a] Including the Police Commissioner.



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Humanitarian situation in the Middle East

Note by the Secretary-General

Pursuant to a request by members of the Security Council at the consultations of the whole held on 28 July 2006, the Secretary-General hereby transmits the briefing delivered on the same day to Council members by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, on the humanitarian situation in the Middle East.

06-44917 (E) 310706

Statement of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in the Middle East

28 July 2006

I have just returned from a six-day mission to three war zones: Lebanon, northern Israel, and Gaza. I was an eyewitness to the devastating effects of the current hostilities on civilians. I met with humanitarian colleagues to plan the necessary emergency operations to address the worsening humanitarian situation in the region. I also had the opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Fouad Siniora, and key ministers of his Cabinet, as well as the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri. In Israel, I met with the Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, and the Defence Minister Amir Peretz. I also had a meeting with the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, and his key advisers.

The Middle East is at a crossroads. My fear is that more violence, more missiles, more terror, and more destruction creates more anger, more hatred, and more disillusioned youths, and ultimately leads to less security throughout the region. Civilians on all sides are the losers of this endless cycle of violence.

Lebanon

The humanitarian situation in Lebanon is dramatic: tens of thousands are fleeing the fighting; hundreds are wounded; and dozens die every day. I witnessed, at first hand, how the civilian population is caught in the crossfire. The destruction, the number of casualties, and the fear and terror inflicted by the continued air strikes was greater than I had expected. The situation, already terrible when I arrived in the region, last Sunday, got worse by the day. Beirut, just three weeks ago the vibrant symbol of Lebanon's recovery from civil war, is now a virtual ghost town. Young people are thinking of leaving the country, as they have lost confidence in a peaceful future in Lebanon.

Lebanese and international humanitarian organizations are trying to come to the relief of as many people as possible. Today, another 10-truck United Nations convoy, painstakingly, made its way from Beirut to Saida and inland to Jezzine. What used to be a 1½-hour drive has now become a 6-hour ordeal, on totally clogged roads. We have established humanitarian corridors by land and by sea to Beirut as well as a notification channel to the Israeli forces to guarantee safe passage for the increasing number of our convoys. They provide urgently needed relief items to hundreds of thousands in the south of Lebanon and other areas such as the Bekaa Valley.

We are hoping to provide some 10,000 tons of relief supplies in the next month alone through these corridors, which I called for in my briefing to you last Friday and in my letters to the Israeli and Lebanese Governments of last week. That is provided there are no attacks on any of our convoys from any of the parties involved. The direct hit sustained by the United Nations post in Khiam, resulting in the tragic killing of our colleagues, has caused considerable anxiety among our relief workers. The hit took place despite repeated notifications and assurances to spare the post. If we agree on notification procedures with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), as we have, then we must be able to absolutely trust that the chain of

command within IDF is working. Just this morning I have received reports that a non-United Nations relief convoy was hit in the south of Lebanon.

Yet it must be clear to all, the parties to the conflict and the members of the Security Council, that the limited and carefully controlled assistance we will be able to provide through this notification system with IDF is not enough to prevent the excessive suffering of the civilian population. We need an immediate cessation of hostilities, followed by a ceasefire agreement, the deployment of a security force, and the political settlement of the conflict, as proposed by the Secretary-General.

The level of displacement, primarily from southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut, has now reached approximately 700,000. An estimated 100,000 people are victims of the siege of their homes, towns and villages. Already, some 210,000 have fled Lebanon as refugees to the neighbouring Syrian Arab Republic and Cyprus. Among them are 115,000 third-country nationals, many of whom do not have the financial means to travel back to their home countries. Every day of fighting displaces tens of thousands more.

It was heartbreaking to visit some of these internally displaced persons in the Metn region of Lebanon, a Druze area. Several hundreds, 85 per cent of whom are women, children, and even babies, were cramped into a school with six toilets, each small classroom filled with some 20 people and the few belongings they were able to bring along. Already among the poorest, they have lost their belongings and are now faced with skyrocketing prices for basic goods. This small region alone is host to more than 250,000 displaced, of whom 67,000 are sheltered in schools, hospitals or community centres.

There, I also met some of the survivors from the village of Srifa in south Lebanon where 20 people died during the air strikes on 19 July. Their desperate appeal to me was that the bodies of their killed family members be recovered from the rubble of their homes. "We cannot sleep at night", one woman said. "We have heard that the dogs are eating their bodies." This is one of the cases I raised directly with the Israeli authorities, requesting their assistance in facilitating the recovery and burial of the bodies in accordance with Islamic tradition.

The civilian death toll in Lebanon stands now at more than 600, according to the Minister of Health. The majority are women and children. In the Dahiyeh suburb of south Beirut, a Hizbollah stronghold, I could see the devastating effects of 10 days of massive air strikes on a residential area. Apartment buildings of 6 to 10 storeys had been levelled, block by block. The rubble was covered with schoolbooks, children's clothing, photographs, and other personal belongings.

I urged the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister of Israel in my meetings to review the conduct of the air strikes and bombardments to avoid excessive use of force that inflicts disproportionate suffering on the civilian population. When there are clearly more dead children than actual combatants, the conduct of hostilities must be reviewed.

At the same time, I repeatedly and publicly appealed from within Lebanon that the armed men of Hizbollah must stop their deplorable tactic of hiding ammunition, arms, or combatants among civilians. Using civilian neighbourhoods as human camouflage is abhorrent and in violation of international humanitarian law.

The ongoing air strikes have crushed civilian infrastructure in many parts of Lebanon. Airports, seaports, roads and bridges have been systematically destroyed. An example is the destruction of the Mdeirij Bridge, the highest in the Middle East, on the main highway connecting Beirut and Damascus. The bridge was the result of a four-year joint development venture with Italy and considered vital to the economy of Lebanon. The bridge was rendered unusable in the first days of the conflict and is now, just like the coastal highway from Beirut via Saida to Tyre, impossible to use, even for relief convoys. The damage to infrastructure is already estimated at billions of dollars and will severely hamper an early economic recovery of Lebanon from this conflict.

Northern Israel

The devastating impact of this conflict on the civilian population is not confined to Lebanon. Hundreds of thousands of Israeli civilians suffer as well. Daily Hizbollah rocket attacks are spreading constant fear and terror among the civilian population. In Haifa, I saw the damage done by one of the 80 Katyusha rocket attacks to a three-storey residential family home. The civilian population spends much of the time in shelters. Altogether, the attacks have left some 20 dead and hundreds wounded by more than 1,000 rockets that so far have rained indiscriminately on the population in northern Israel.

In fact, while in Haifa meeting with the Foreign Minister, we had to take shelter ourselves when one such Katyusha rocket hit the city. These senseless attacks must stop. As the mayor of Haifa told me, "the attacks have undermined the very moderate forces in Israel who argued for a withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and who promoted peace and reconciliation with Arab neighbours".

Occupied Palestinian Territory

As we call for an immediate ceasefire, political solutions and security arrangements in Lebanon, we must ensure that we do not forget to address the armed conflict and deepening social and economic crisis in Gaza, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a whole. Renewed fighting just a day after my visit to Gaza killed a 3-year-old Palestinian girl. Altogether, 150 have lost their life since the present conflict broke out in June, one quarter of whom are reported to be children.

When visiting Gaza, I was deeply saddened to find the great visions that we had in Oslo for a peaceful and prosperous Palestine, coexisting in safety and security with a recognized Israel, shattered. Those hopes have been replaced by a deep sense of despair and disillusionment. The destruction of vital civilian infrastructure such as bridges, roads, and the only electrical power plant in Gaza, the ongoing closure of most border crossings into and out of Gaza, and frequent roadblocks are suffocating any attempt at building a viable economic and social infrastructure in Gaza. As a result, anger and the readiness to resort to militant violence seem to be growing, particularly among young people.

I saw the destruction of every single transformer of the power plant in Gaza, covering 55 per cent of Gaza's electricity needs, including that of homes, schools and hospitals. Today, private households, hospitals, and water pumps receive some three to four hours of electricity supply per day, often not synchronized with the few hours during which water is being supplied. Some Israeli officials have conceded that the destruction of this purely civilian installation was indeed unwise.

The repeated destruction of infrastructure is also taking its toll on aid workers. It was disheartening to feel their sense of frustration and disillusionment. The produce from the greenhouses erected as part of James Wolfenson's efforts was all destroyed in the recent violence as were the bridges built by UNDP with European aid over several years. Some of our colleagues are ready to give up. But we cannot allow this to happen. How can we give up on 1.4 million inhabitants of Gaza, half of them children? It is now, more than ever, that the Occupied Palestinian Territory needs our collective assistance.

The following needs to happen in Gaza:

- **Violence must stop**. We must support the efforts of President Abu Mazen and international mediators aimed at stopping militants from lobbing Qassam rockets at Israeli settlements and releasing the soldier held in captivity. Israel, in turn, must end its often excessive and disproportionate use of force, as was the case in the destruction of the power plant and the shelling that takes the lives of civilians.

- **Rebuild vital infrastructure**. We must help the Palestinian Authority to re-establish a social and economic infrastructure that will provide employment and hope, and help to curb the extreme radicalization of Gaza's youth.

- **Open border crossings**. We encourage the Israeli authorities to establish a transparent and reliable regime at the key crossing point into and out of Gaza. I have proposed to the Defence Minister a regular weekly working meeting between IDF and the United Nations to facilitate the transport of humanitarian and other urgently needed goods into Gaza.

Conclusions

Throughout my mission to all three war zones my public message was consistent:

- The indiscriminate rain of rockets into Israel must stop.

- The excessive and disproportionate use of force by the Israel Defense Forces in both Lebanon and Gaza must stop.

- The hiding of armed combatants and weaponry among the civilian populations in Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territory must stop.

- And, most importantly, as the Secretary-General has repeatedly said, we need a cessation of hostilities immediately.

As a first step, I am recommending to the Secretary-General, and through him to you, a humanitarian truce. We need at least 72 hours of tranquillity for the sake of the children of Lebanon and northern Israel who, I believe, we all agree are the innocent victims of this escalating conflict. During this humanitarian truce a major operation could be staged with ICRC, the Lebanese Red Cross, and the United Nations and its partner organizations to do the following:

- First, relocate the children, the wounded, the disabled, and the elderly who have not been able to escape the fighting in the worst war zones.

- Second, resupply hospitals and health centres, particularly in the south, with emergency medical relief items and fuel for generators to avoid a complete breakdown of public health facilities caring for the thousands of wounded.
- Third, provide water and sanitation facilities, food and other basic supplies to the tens of thousands of displaced who are seeking shelter in public buildings in the conflict zones.
- Fourth, establish an emergency communication system to vulnerable communities allowing us to address acute needs urgently where and when they arise.

In conclusion: we humanitarians will do what we can to save lives and alleviate suffering. But, as stated before, aid in itself is not the solution. It is only a temporary "plaster on the wound". Only an end to the fighting and a political settlement that will give the peoples of Israel, Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territory the security and socio-economic conditions they deserve will prevent future conflict and suffering.

As humanitarian workers, we are frustrated and feel that the work on the political and security agreements is too slow. We are afraid that in the meantime the parties to the conflict are continuing its escalation, thereby prolonging the suffering of civilians and causing more hatred and sorrow today that they will regret tomorrow.

Let me end the way I began, with a plea for the immediate protection of the civilian population in all three war zones. Civilians must be protected at any cost. If there are many more dead children in a conflict than armed men, there is something fundamentally wrong, not only with how the armed men behave and where they hide, but also with the way the response is being conducted.

Lebanon

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

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Security Council

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Letter dated 26 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a letter from Manouchehr Motaki, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, addressed to you on the ongoing aggression against Lebanese and Palestinian civilians.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the circulation of the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) M. Javad **Zarif**

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Annex to the letter dated 26 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

With profound regret, the international community continues to witness the ruthless and extensive aggression of the Zionist regime against the defenceless peoples of Palestine and Lebanon and their economic and civilian infrastructures. More regrettably, neither did the United Nations Security Council, which bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and suppressing acts of aggression, undertake any action with a view to stopping this full-fledged aggression, nor did it show any willingness to this end.

The extensive and brutal attacks by the Zionist regime are not only indicative of that regime's pre-existing plan to embark on a wide-ranging onslaught against Lebanon, but they are also demonstrating the prior confidence of military commanders and political leadership of that regime about the unqualified support of the United States Government and, consequently, the lack of any effective action on the part of the Security Council.

Blind and indiscriminate attacks by the Zionist regime on residential areas, directly targeting innocent civilian populations and the destruction of Lebanese and Palestinian political, social and economic infrastructure amount to gross violation of the basic norms and principles of international law. These do not come as a surprise from a regime founded on occupation and with a track record of flouting numerous Security Council resolutions. However, it is astonishing that the Security Council fails to act on such a cruel onslaught, which is a blatant threat to international peace and security, and paves the way for the criminals to continue their attacks. Undoubtedly, such a barefaced and double standard approach, as well as contempt for the lives of the Muslims, only leads to hatred and abhorrence of the international community and people with clear conscience, and gives rise to further instability and violence in the volatile region of the Middle East.

The Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, through their brave resistance, have and will teach an unforgettable lesson to the aggressors and occupiers. And there should be no doubt about the ultimate victory of these two oppressed peoples. Nonetheless, the international community should live up to its responsibilities. The Zionist regime should be held accountable for the consequences of its inhumane aggression, and arrangements should be made to compensate the victims of these atrocities in Palestine and Lebanon.

Expressing deep concern over the continuation of the current situation, I consider it most likely that an extensive humanitarian disaster in Lebanon will occur if the Security Council chooses to continue its inaction in the face of the ongoing tragedy, and I express alarm about that situation. I earnestly request you to use all your good offices to put an end to the inhumane attacks against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. The world community, especially the Muslims across the globe, expect you to carry out your responsibilities under the United Nations Charter and spare no efforts to bring the Zionist regime's unjust aggression to a halt.

(*Signed*) Manouchehr **Motaki**
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the Islamic Republic of Iran